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EXTRADITION REFORM: EXECUTIVE
DISCRETION AND JUDICIAL
PARTICIPATION IN THE
EXTRADITION OF POLITICAL
TERRORISTS

Steven Lubet*

The unprecedented attention given to three recent cases of
international extradition, each involving an incident of terrorviolence,' has led to the first full-scale legislative evaluation of the
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University, Chicago, Illinois. A.B. Northwestern
University, 1970; J.D. University of California at Berkeley, 1973. The author would like
to thank Barbara Shulman and Jonathan Rosenberg, Northwestern University School of
Law class of 1984, for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), aff'g, In re Abu Eain, Magis.
No. 79 M 175 (N.D. IM., opinion filed Dec. 18, 1979), cert . denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); In
re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y., opinion filed August 13), aft'd, United States v.
Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1899 M.G. (N.D. Cal.,
Memorandum decision filed May 11, 1979). See infra notes 35-42 and 147-49 and
accompanying text.

248

CORATELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURIV4L

[Vol. 15:247

extradition law of the United States since 1882.2 The cases illustrate
the inadequacy of both the substantive and procedural law
governing the political offense exception to extradition. 3
Congressional deliberations have resulted in extensive public debate
and scholarly analysis of the definition of a political offense and of
the process for determining whether political offenders are
4
extraditable.

This article discusses the history and current status of the
political offense exception in the extradition law of the United States,
highlighting the deficiencies in the antiquated process. The article

analyzes the reform proposals which have been presented to
Congress and recommends substantive and procedural changes in
the law of extradition. The contemporary international environment
requires an extradition law that reduces the ability of terrorists to
claim the protection of the political offense exception, but which
retains the vitality of the concept of political asylum for legitimate
dissidents. This article recommends a process that preserves the
strengths of the tradition of the United States, and satisfies the
requirements of the contemporary environment.
I
THE ORIGIN AND FUNCTION OF THE
POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION
The political offense exception to extradition emerged in the
nineteenth century. 5 When it first developed, extradition was used

as a tool for the apprehension of political dissidents; however, as
2. See H.R. REp. No. 627, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, n.3 (1982). Congress has
considered three versions of extradition reform: H.R. 6046, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982);
S. 1940, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) and S. 1639, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). S. 1940
passed the Senate on August 19, 1982. 128 CONG. REC. S. 10884 (daily ed.). The House,
however, did not consider it before the end of the 97th Congress.
3. See infra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g. ExtraditionAct of1982: Hearingson HA.? 5227 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); ExtraditionAct
of 1981: Hearingson S. 1639 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981); Hannay, International Terrorism and the Political Offense Exception to
Extradition, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 381 (1980); InternationalProceduresfor the
Apprehension andRendition ofFugitive Offenders. A Panel, 74 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.
274 (1980) (remarks by Bassiouni, Kenney and Williams, and discussion); Lubet and
Czaczkes, The Role ofthe American Judiciaryin the Extradition0/PoliticalTerrorists, 71
J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY 193 (1980).

5. See HarvardDraft Convention on Extradition,29 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPPLEMENTS 1,
107-19 (1935). The "practice of non-extradition of political offenders [in the early part of
the 19th century] ... may be explained by two main factors: (1) the evolution of political institutions following the French Revolution; (2) the growing consciousness of the
interdependence of nations following the Industrial Revolution." Id at 108. See also
M.R. GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND-ASYLUM

(1956).

AS A HUMAN RIGHT 73-76
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constitutional government evolved, sovereigns began to accept the
legitimacy of political dissent.6 In 1833 Belgium enacted the first legislation exempting political offenders from extradition;7 the first

treaty containing a political offense exception to extradition was executed between Belgium and France in 1834.8
The United States has never enacted a domestic statute embod-

ying the political offense exception, undoubtedly because such legislation was viewed as redundant to the widely accepted principle that

extradition could not lie for a political offense. 9 As early as 1853 the
United States recognized that political offenders were protected from

rendition, notwithstanding the absence of a specific treaty clause or
statute.Io
The political offense exception is now so well accepted in inter-

national law that it has become more than simply an optional provision to be found in bilateral treaties. The concept of political asylum
is included in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, I'
6. Before the 19th century, with fragmented medieval dynasties, the extreme hardship associated with the extradition process necessitated limiting its use to the apprehension and punishment of those who threatened the political system. GARCIA-MORA, supra
note 5, at 73. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, however, political dissent became
acceptable. Id. at 73-76; HarvardDraft Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'L L.
SUPPLEMENTS 108-09 (1935). See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison
(Jan. 30, 1787) ("I hold it, that a little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing, and as
necessary in the political world as storms in the physical."); and J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 2
(A. Oostell ed. 1947) ("political liberties or rights which it was to be regarded as a breach
of duty in the rule to infringe, and which, if he did infringe, specific resistance, or general
rebellion, was to be held justifiable.").
7. Laws of 1 October 1833, art. 6 (Belgium).
8. See I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17-19 (1971); M.R.
GARCIA-MORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS HUMAN RIGHT 75, 94 (1956)

(Article 4 of the Convention on Extradition of November 22, 1834, between France and
Belgium provided: "It is expressly stipulated that a foreigner whose extradition has been
granted, cannot, in any case, be prosecuted or punished for a political crime antecedent
to the extradition or for any act connected with such a crime.") (quoting from A. BILLOT,
TRAITf DE L'EXTRADITION III (1874)).
9. See 1 J.B. Moore, EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION §§ 205-218 and
303-326 (1891); 1 L.F.L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW §§ 333-337 and 573-579
(McNair ed. 1928); F.T. PIGGOrr, EXTRADITION 44-62 (1910). See also SHEARER, supra
note 8, at 73-94; HarvardDraft Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPPLEMENTS 107-119 (1935).
10. Exparte Kaine, 14 F. Cas. 79, 81-82 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1853) (No. 7597).
11. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(111), U.N. Doc. A/
810, at 74 (1948) (3d Sess., Ist Part), provides in Article 14: "1. Everyone has the right to
seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. 2. This right may not be
invoked in the case of prosecution genuinely arising from nonpolitical crimes or from
acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations." The General Assembly voted on each article of the Declaration and on the Declaration as a whole. Article
14 was adopted by 44 votes to six with two abstentions. No roll call was taken for the
vote on each article; therefore, there is no record of the members casting negative votes or
abstaining. The Declaration as a whole was adopted by 48 votes with eight abstentions.
The abstaining members were Byelorossian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, Saudi Arabia, Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of South Africa,
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and many states protect political offenders from rendition by domestic legislation.' 2 Indeed, a form of the political offense exception is
contained in the constitutions of Brazil, 13 Mexico,' 4 Italy,' 5 and
Spain.' 6 The United States, though lacking a constitutional or statu-

tory provision, has included the political offense exception in each of
its 96 treaties of extradition.' 7 Given the near universality of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia. 3(1) U.N. GAOR (183d plen. mtg.)
at 933 (1948). For the discussions in the Committee on Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Questions on the provision for asylum of political offenders, see 3(1) U.N. GAOR
C. 3 (121st-122nd mtgs.) at 327, U.N. Doe. E/800 (1948). On the communist support for
aspects of political asylum see Gold, Non-extraditionfor Poilitcal Offenses: The Communis Perspective, 11 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191 (1970).
12. For example, the extradition statute of the Federal Republic of Germany provides in part: "Extradition is not permissible when the act for which extradition is sought
is a political one or is connected with a political act in such a way that it prepared,
secures, or covers it, or guards against it. Deutsches Auslieferungsgesetz [DAG] § 3(1),
Vom. 23. December 1929 Reichsgesetzblatt [RGB1] I 239, as amended by 1974
Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] 1469 (W. Ger.).
Similarly, Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52, § 3, of the United Kingdom
provides:
A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offense in respect of which his
surrender is demanded is one of a political character, or if he proves to the satisfaction of the police magistrate or the court before whom he is brought on
habeas corpus, or to the Secretary of State, that the requisition for his surrender
has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him for an offence of a political character.
The Israeli statute on Extradition Law provides at Section 10: " Ihe Court shall not
declare a wanted person subject to extradition if it finds that there are reasonable
grounds for assuming ... that the request for extradition aims at prosecuting or punishing him for an offence of a political character, thoughprimaface it is not made in connection with such an offence." Extradition Act, 5714-1954, 8 Laws of the State of Israel
145 (Authorized Translation from the Hebrew, Prepared at the Ministry of Justice).
13. CONSTITUICAo art. 153 (Brazil).
14. CONSTITUClON art. 15 (Mexico).
15. CONSTITUZIONE art. 1, app. A (Italy).
16. CONSTITUCION art. 1, para. 3 (Spain).
17. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3181 (Supp. 1982). The United States has entered into bilateral extradition treaties with the following nations:
Albania
Grenada
Norway
Argentina
Guatemala
Pakistan
Australia
Guyana
Panama
Austria
Haiti
Papua N~w Guinea
Bahamas
Honduras
Paraguay
Barbados
Hungary
Peru
Belgium
Iceland
Poland
Bolivia
India
Portugal
Brazil
Iraq
Romania
Bulgaria
Ireland
San Marino
Burma
Israel
Seychelles
Canada
Italy
Sierra Leone
Chile
Jamaica
Singapore
Columbia
Japan
Solomon Islands
Congo (Brazzaville)
Kenya
South Africa
Costa Rica
Latvia
Spain
Cuba
Lesotho
Sri Lanka
Cyprus
Liberia
Surinam
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exception, it is now possible to speak of an international right to, or
at least an international norm of, political asylum.
Two policies underlie the political offense exception. From the
perspective of the requested state, the exception permits a sovereign
(1) to refuse to become involved in the domestic affairs of another
country, and (2) to extend humanitarian relief to political dissidents.' 8 These two policies reflect the "neutrality function" and the
"fairness function" of the political offense exception.
The neutrality function exists purely for reasons of state. It
allows a government to decline to surrender a fugitive in order to
avoid embarrassing involvement in the political affairs of another
country. This function recognizes that today's rebels may become
tomorrow's victors and that today's government officials may
become tomorrow's fugitives.19 Thus, all other considerations aside,
a state may wish to remain aloof from the political turmoil in
another country, against the day when such involvement might be
seen as sponsorship of one contending side or the other. This aspect
of the political offense exception is value free, and may explain why
the adoption and acceptance of the exception is not limited to states
with democratic governments.20
Swaziland
Liechtenstein
Czechoslovakia
Sweden
Lithuania
Denmark
Switzerland
Luxembourg
Dominican Republic
Tanzania
Malawi
Ecuador
Thailand
Egypt
Malaysia
Tonga
El Salvador
Malta
Trinidad and Tobago
Mauritius
Estonia
Turkey
Mexico
Fiji
United Arab Republic
Monaco
Finland
United Kingdom
Nauru
France
Uruguay
Netherlands
Gambia
Venezuela
New Zealand
Germany, Federal
Yugoslavia
Republic of
Nicaragua
Zambia
Nigeria
Ghana
Greece
18. See ExtraditionAct of1981: Hearingson S. 1639 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 49 (1981) (Testimony of W. Hannay, attorney at law)
[hereinafter referred to as Hearings on S. 16391.
19. See, e.g., Jiminez v. Aristeguieta, 311 F.2d 547 (1962), a 'dper cur/am sub nom.
Jiminez v. Hixon, 314 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963) (former chief
executive of Venezuela).
20. For example, the United States has extradition treaties containing the political
offense exception with Albania, Mar. 1, 1933, 49 Stat. 3313, T.S. No. 902; Argentina, Jan.
21, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3501, T.I.A.S. No. 7510; Bulgaria, Mar. 19, 1924, 43 Stat. 1886, T.S.
No. 687; Chile, Apr. 17, 1900, 32 Stat. 1850, T.S. No. 407; Haiti, Aug. 9, 1904, 34 Stat.
2858, T.S. No. 447; Hungary, July 3, 1856, 11 Stat. 691, T.S. No. 9; Iraq, June 7, 1934,49
Stat. 3380, T.S. No. 907; Poland, Apr. 5, 1935,46 Siat. 2282, T.S. No. 908; Rumania, July
23, 1924, 44 Stat. 2020, T.S. No. 713; South Africa, Dec. 18, 1947, 2 U.S.T. 884, T.I.A.S.
No. 9891; and Yugoslavia, Oct. 25, 1901, 32 Stat. 1890, T.S. No. 406.
In addition, an extradition treaty has been negotiated by the executive authorities of
the United States and the Philippines, although it has not yet come before the Senate for
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The fairness function reflects a principled desire to give haven

to political dissidents. 21 This approach necessarily implies a value
judgment as to the motives of the fugitive and the nature of the
requesting government. It has been argued that the fairness function

precludes the return of any rebel to the government against which he
has taken up arms, on the theory that he will never receive a fair trial
under such circumstances. 22 The courts of the United States have

rejected this last theory with regard to extradition requests originating from democratic countries, 23 but otherwise have recognized the
validity of the fairness function in evaluating an individual's right to

assert the political offense exception in defense of an extradition
action. 24
approval. See, U.S. Policy Toward the Philpines,1981: HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
on Asian and PacficAffairs and on Human Rights andInternationalOrganizationsof the
House Comm. on ForeignAffairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1981) (statement of C.H.
Lande, Professor of Political Science, University of Kansas).
21. See Hearingson S. 1639, supra note 18, at 49-50 (testimony of W. Hannay, attorney at law):
As extradition treaties became prevalent in the 19th century, democratic
nations undoubtedly found themselves facing the unpleasant task of sending a
political dissenter or activist back to a tyrannical regime to stand trial for acts
which they did not perceive as "criminal" in any ethical or moral sense.
Through the mechanism of the "political offense" exception, a conflict between
the affirmative obligation to extradite under a treaty and the desire to grant political asylum was avoided. The fugitive newspaper editor charged with sedition or
the futigive political candidate charged with treason merely for expressing their
opinions could be sheltered from extradition for these "pure" political offenses,
the sort of offense directly implicating cherished democratic values. In addition,
the fugitive dissident charged with criminal trespass during a protest or rally
could be sheltered for this "relative" political offense, the sort of offense that
smacks of a "trumped up" charge.
On pure and relative political offenses, see infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text. On
the historical perspective, see supra note 6 and accompanying text, and M.R. GARCIAMORA, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT 73-76 (1956).

22. See, e.g., GARCIA-MORA, supra note 21, at 75:

The raison d'etre of the [political offense exception] can be found in the wellfounded apprehension that to surrender unsuccessful rebels to the demanding
state would surely amount to delivering them to their summary execution, or, in
any event, to the risk of being tried and punished by a justice colored by political
passion.
See also 2 C.C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY

THE UNITED STATES 1019 (1951) (discussing the "reluctance to surrender a fugitive who
might be exposed to summary and arbitrary treatment if restored to the clutches of the
demanding government").
23. See generaly Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
894 (1981). But the State Department recognized the problem of a fair trial in Mexico
when it refused to extradite General Huertas in 1915. See GARCIA-MORA, supra note 21,
at 95 n.17.
24. See, e.g., In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y., opinion filed August 13),
af'd, United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re McMullen, No. 3-781899 M.G. (N.D. Cal., memorandum decision filed May 11, 1979). But V. Hearingon S.
1639, supra note 18, at 48-49 (testimony ofW. Hannay, attorney at law) (emphasizing the
lack of substantive rights on the part of the accused to assert the political offense
exception).
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The enlightened statesmen who originated the exception left the
term "political offense" undefined in order to encompass a broad
range of protected activity.25 Two categories of political offenses
evolved, however, that aided in the conceptualization of the exception: "pure" and "relative" political offenses. 26 The purely political
offenses are never extraditable and are limited to crimes such as treason, sedition and espionage, which comprise acts directed against the
state. 27 The concept of a relative political offense provides protection for a far greater range of activity; common crimes may not be
extraditable if committed in connection with a political act. Thus, a
homocide committed in the course of a general uprising may be nonextraditable if a sufficient nexus exists between the crime and the
28
political event.
In recent times, however, the philosophic concept of broad protection for political offenders has eroded in view of the phenomenon
of terrorism. The nobility of asylum, and even the desirability of
neutrality, necessarily must pale when we realize that the exemption
has been invoked on behalf of men like Abu Daoud, the author of
the massacre at the Munich Olympics. 2 9 Thus, the imprecision
which was adequate in simpler times, now should give way to a more
careful definition of "political offense." The definition must combine the breadth necessary to protect legitimate dissidents with the
stringency sufficient to exclude those whose chosen form of expression is to engage in wanton violence. The word "political" has different meanings in different contexts, and a nation should be under
no legal or moral obligation to shelter an international fugitive sim30
ply because he claims a revolutionary motive for his crime.
The extradition law of the United States essentially ceased
25. Sir Charles Russell, Q.C., found that the British legislature "purposely abstained
from attempting to give an exhaustive definition" to the words "offence of a political
character" in Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52. In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B.
149, 153.
26. See, e.g., In re Castioni,supra note 25, at 152-68; In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972, 997-1004
(N.D. Cal. 1894); and GARCIA-MORA, supra note 21, at 76-82.
27. See 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 800 (1968); and Garcia-

Mora, The Nature ofPoliticalOffenses: A Knotty Problem of ExtraditionLaw, 48 VA. L.
Rv. 1226, 1230-39 (1962).
28. See Garcia-Mora, supra note 27, at 1239-56; and In re Ezeta, supra note 26, at
1000-04.
29. See Judgment of Jan. 11, 1977, Chambre d'Accusation de la Cour d'appel, Paris
(complete French text on file at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal); and
the following articles in N.Y. Times: Jan. 10, 1977, at Al, col. 1; Jan. 11, 1977, at A4, col.
3; Jan. 12, 1977, at Al, col. 1; Jan. 13, 1977, at Al, col. 1; Jan. 14, 1977, at Al, col. 4. See
also, B.H. WESTON AND A.A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 492

(1980); Note, Bringingthe Terrorist to Justice: A Domestic Law Approach, 11 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 71 (1978); and Note, TheAbu DaoudAffair, 11 J. INr'L L. & ECON. 539 (1977).
30. See Hearingson S. 1639, supra note 18, at 48-51 (testimony of W. Hannay, attorney at law).
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developing at the turn of the century: 31 The extradition process is
governed by a statute which has not been revised substantially since
188232 and courts considering the political offense exception have
adhered to a substantive test adopted in 1896. 33 Thus, the United

States has never modified the extradition process to take into
account the changes in the modem world. International crime and
violence exist today in a form which was unimaginable even one
generation ago. 34 It is ironic that United States extradition law
should attempt to cope with modem terrorism through legal tests
and procedures which predate the advent of air travel, guerilla warfare and urban revolution. It is as though the United States had set
out to apprehend jet-age terrorists through the use of devices that
were developed in the era of the horse and buggy.
The inadequacy of the extradition process was underlined
sharply when three recent cases brought the question of political terrorism into United States courts. In two of these cases, In Re
McMullen3s and In Re Mackin,36 the United States was unable to

effectuate the extradition to Great Britain of Provisional Irish
Republican Army gunmen, because the courts found that the
offenses charged were "political" in that they had been directed at
British soldiers. 37 In the third case, In Re Abu Eain,38 the defendant
was extradited successfully to Israel to stand trial for a marketplace
bombing,39 but only after a two year legal battle over the applicabil31. See supra notes 5-10 and accompanying text; In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149;
Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52 (United Kingdom); M.R. GARCIA-MORA,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ASYLUM AS A HUMAN RIGHT

73-76 (1956); HarvardDraft

Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPPLEMENTS 108-09 (1935).
32. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976).
33. See Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896). The test was adopted from the British
case, In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
34. See generaly An Act to Combat InternationalTerrorism: Hearings on S. 2236
Before the Senate Comm on GovernmentalAffairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
35. In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1899 M.G. (N.D. Cal., memorandum decision filed
May 11, 1979), reprintedin Hearingson S. 1639, supra note 18, at 294.
36. In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y., opinion filed August 13), aft'd,
United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981) (magistrate's opinion reprinted in
Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 18, at 140).
37. The McMullen court found that the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
had been a legitimate political force in Ireland since 1970, that McMullen was a member
of the PIRA and that British Army barracks were prime targets for the PIRA. In re
McMullen, supra note 35, at 6; Hearingson S. 1639, supra note 18, at 294-95.
The Mackin court found that the crime charged was "substantially linked to the traditional goal and strategy of the IRA and the PIRA." In re Mackin, supra note 36, at 98;
Hearings on S, 1639, supra note 18, at 7.
38. In re Abu Eain, Magis. No. 79 M 175 (N.D. Ill., opinion fied Dec. 18, 1979),
ard,Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
39. Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981).
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ity of the political offense exception.40
These cases created substantial concern in the executive branch
of the federal government. The inability of the United States to
extradite McMullen and Mackin for crimes of which there was substantial evidence of guilt4l was perceived as damaging to the diplomatic relationship between the United States and the United
Kingdom.42 The Abu Eain case, although ultimately satisfactory to
the government in its result, was marked by delay, uncertainty, and
controversy due to imprecision in the extradition law.43
The United States judicial system was confronted three times in
short succession with the problem of transnational terrorism. On
each occasion, the process of applying the political offense exception
was found to be lacking as a consequence of its antiquated framework. The courts found that they had no fixed procedure for implementing the political offense exception 44 and no reliable definition of
its scope.45 Furthermore, the judiciary and the executive, based
upon ambiguities in the treaty law, were in complete disagreement as
to the jurisdiction of the courts even to entertain the political offense
question.46
40. After a federal magistrate determined on Dec. 18, 1979, that Abu Eain should be
extradited to Israel, Abu Eain sought a Writ of Habeas Corpus from a district court. The
court denied the writ and the defendant appealed. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the denial in April 1981. Abu Eain then sought a Writ of Certiorari in the
Supreme Court, which was denied on October 13, 1981, nearly twenty-three months after
the original case began. See supra note 39.
41. Probable cause to believe that the Defendant committed an offense was found by
the presiding magistrates in both cases. See In re McMullen, supra note 35, and In re
Mackin, supra note 36.
42. Hearingson S. 1639, supra note 18, at 43 (testimony of W. Hannay, attorney at
law).
43. See supra note 40.
44. See Lubet and Czaczkes, The Role of the American Judiciaryin the Extraditionof
PoliticalTerrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 206 (1980).
45. See Hearingson S. 1639, supra note 18, at 50 (testimony of W. Hannay, attorney
at law). Hannay states that the "circumstances in which a state should refuse to cooperate with injustice by sending a dissident back for certain persecution or refuse to allow
the mechanism of extradition to be used for mere vengeance simply cannot be defined."
Id He further states that "[tihere is no test or rule which meaningfully defines a 'political offense,"' id at 57 (emphasis in original).
46. The United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty provides: "Extradition
shall not be granted if. . . the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by
the requested party as one of a political character." June 8, 1972, art. 5(1) (c)(I), 28 U. S.
T. 22F, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 (Emphasis added). In the Mackin case the government argued
that "requested party" meant the executive department and not the courts. See Brief for
Appellant at 28, United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981), reprintedin Hearings on S.1639, supra note 18, at 241,274. The court held this interpretation to be incorrect, based on the ambiguity of the phrase "requested party" and the fact that many other
United States treaties specifically provide that the judiciary shall make decisions concerning the political offense exception. United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 132-35
(2d. Cir. 1981).
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The situation clearly called for reform, and the federal executive

responded by proposing broad revisions of United States extradition
law.47 The first proposal came in the form of a draft Extradition Act

of 1981,48 which was prepared jointly by the Department of State,
49
the Department of Justice and the Senate Judiciary Committee.
This bill addressed numerous procedural and technical shortcomings

in the law, but it was clear to most observers that the primary impetus for reform came from dissatisfaction with the results in the Mackin and McMullen cases.50 The process advocated by the executive
branch spawned alternative reform proposals. Much debate cen-

tered around the definition of a political offense, the procedure and
allocation of burden of proof in the extradition process, and the
appropriate roles of the judiciary and executive in the determination
of the extradition question. Before discussing this and subsequent
proposals for extradition reform, the following section presents an
overview of the current extradition law of the United States.
II
CONTEMPORARY EXTRADITION LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES
A.

THE EXTRADITION PROCESS

International extradition is controlled by federal statute. 5' A
foreign state may invoke the process only if there is a treaty in force
between the United States and the requesting country. 52 An author47. See H.R. REP No. 627, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982); and Hearings on S.1639,
supra note 18, at 14-19.
48. S.1639, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
49. See 127 CONG. REC. S9952 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981) (statement of Sen.
Thurmond).
50. See, e.g., 127 CONG. REC. S9956, S9959 n. 61 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1981) (Memorandum on Extradition Legislation). See also Hearingson S. 1639, supra note 18, at 25
(testimony of W. Hannay, attorney at law). Hannay cites the decisions in McMullen,
supra note 35, and In re Mackin, supra note 36, as support for removing the jurisdiction
of the courts to decide the applicability of the political offense exception, id. at 25-27.
Hannay also states that the purpose of S.1639, supra note 48, is to correct a fundamental
flaw in extradition procedure revealed by those cases. Hearingson S.1639, supra note 18,
at 39.
51. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3195 (1976).
52. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181, 3184 (1976); Valentine v. United States exrel. Neidecker,
299 U.S. 5, 7-13 (1936); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933); United States
v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 412-14 (1886); Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 78 (2d Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1961); Argento v. Horn, 241 F.2d 258, 259-61 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 818 (1957); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 935-36 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1948); Exparte McCabe, 46 F. 363 (W.D. Tex. 1891);
Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459, 460-61 (S.D. Fla. 1959). But see Evans, LegalBases of
Extradition in the United States, 16 N.Y.L. FORUM 525, 528 (1970):
The Arguelles case is apparently the sole exception of record to the rule that the
United States may extradite a fugitive only in pursuance of treaty terms. Here,
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ized representative of the requesting country53 initiates the process
by filing a verified complaint charging that a person has committed
an extraditable offense within the jurisdiction of the requesting government. 54 No formal diplomatic request is required prior to the
filing of the complaint, 55 but the foreign government may supplement the complaint by submitting a requisition to the Secretary of
56
State at any time during the proceeding.
While current law allows an extradition complaint to be filed in
any federal or state court if the fugitive is found within its jurisdiction,57 the consistent practice is to conduct these proceedings in the
Federal Courts.5 8 Similarly, although the statute authorizes a hearing to be held before any federal district court judge or authorized
magistrate,5 9 recent cases almost invariably have been referred to
61
magistrates 6 0-the lowest ranking officers in the federal judiciary.
The role of the court of extradition is to determine whether
there is sufficient evidence to warrant the return of the fugitive to the
requesting country. 62 The accused is extraditable only if the requesting country establishes that a valid treaty is in effect, 63 that the person named in the complaint or requisition is the same individual
who is before the court, 64 and that the acts charged in the complaint
constitute a crime in both the requesting country and the United
the accused [Don Jose Augustin], a Spanish subject charged with engaging in the
slave trade, was surrendered to Spanish authorities in 1864 under summary circumstances as an act of comity by Presidential Order and returned. The incident
provoked considerable criticism in Congress.
(citing 1 J.B. Moore, EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION § 27 (1891)). According to Evans, supra at 529, "[t]hat the instance is sui generis proves the rule as far as
American extradition practice is concerned."
53. Although the representative often will be a counsul or diplomatic officer, it is
only necessary that the person filing the complaint have authorization from the requesting country. This necessitates the court's determination of the legitimacy of the authorization. See United States ex rel Caputo v. Kelly, 92 F.2d 603, cert. denied, 303 U.S. 635
(1937).
54. See Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 18, at 320 (memorandum on Extradition
Legislation, Prepared by the Staff of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, in
Cooperation with the Departments of State and Justice).
55. Id. See also United States ex rel Caputo v. Kelly, supra note 53.
56. Id
57. See 18 U.S.C. §)184 (1976); and supra note 54.
58. See supra note 54.
59. See 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976).
60. See cases cited in supra note I.
61. See United States Magistrates, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (1976 & Supp. V 1982).
62. See, e.g., Benson v. MacMahon, 127 U.S. 457, 460-63 (1888); and Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
63. See Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565, 566 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
818 (1954). See also Note, United States ExtraditionProcedures, 16 N.Y.L. FORUM 420,
441 (1970); and cases cited in supra note 52.
64. See, e.g., Benson v. MacMahon, supra note 62.
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States. 65 Finally, the court must determine whether there is sufficient proof that an offense has actually occurred. 66 This final
requirement generally is satisfied by a showing of "probable cause"
to believe that the accused committed the acts charged, 67 that being
the standard for commitment for trial under the Federal Rules of
68
Criminal Procedure.
Because an extradition hearing is not a plenary proceeding
involving the guilt or innocence of the accused, wide latitude is given
with regard to the production and admissibility of evidence. The
Federal Rules of Evidence need not apply, and hearsay is admitted
freely in the form of affidavits, depositions or other pertinent documents, 6 9 subject only to a requirement of authentication.70 The
requesting country need not produce witnesses. 7 1
The defendant's right to present evidence is limited to that
65. Id; and Freedman v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 1252, 1263 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
See also l.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 137-41 (1971); and 6 M.
727, 773-79 (1968).
66. See, e.g., Pettit v. Walshe, 194 U.S. 205 (1904); Benson v. MacMahon, supra note
62; O'Brien v. Rozman, 554 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1977); Peroff v. Hylton, supra note 62;
United States ex rel Rauch v. Stockinger, 170 F. Supp. 506 (E.D.N.Y. 1959), aft'd 269
F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1959), cert.denied, 361 U.S. 913 (1959); United States ex rel. LoPizzo v.
Mathues, 36 F.2d 565 (3rd Cir. 1929).
67. Id See also Brauch v. Raiche, 618 F.2d 843, 847 (1st Cir. 1980); Greci v. Birknes,
52 F.2d 956, 958 (Ist Cir. 1976); Sindona v. Grant, 461 F. Supp. 199, 204 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Application of D'Amico, 185 F. Supp. 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), appeal dismissed
sub nom. United States ex rel D'Amico v. Bishopp, 286 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1962).
68. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a) provides:
Probable Cause Finding. If from the evidence it appears that there is probable
cause to believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the federal magistrate shall forthwith hold him to answer in district
court. The finding of probable cause may be based upon hearsay evidence in
whole or in part. The defendant may cross-examine witnesses against him and
may introduce evidence in his own behalf. Objections to evidence on the ground
that it was acquired by unlawful means are not properly made at the preliminary
examination. Motions to suppress must be made to the trial court as provided in
Rule 12.
69. See supra note 68; Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 317 (1922); Bingham v. Bradley, 241 U.S. 511, 517 (1916); O'Brien v. Rozman, 554 F.2d 780 (6th Cir. 1977); Sayne v.
Shipley, 418 F.2d 679, 685 (5th Cir. 1969), cer. denied, 398 U.S. 903 (1970); and In re
David, 395 F. Supp. 803, 807 (E.D. Il1. 1975).
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 3190 (1976):
Depositions, warrants, or other papers or copies thereof offered in evidence upon
the hearing of any extradition case shall be received and admitted as evidence on
such hearing for all the purposes of such hearing if they shall be properly and
legally authenticated so as to entitle them to be received for similar purposes by
the tribunals of the foreign country from which the accused party shall have
escaped, and the certificate of the principal diplomatic or consular officer of the
United States resident in such foreign country shall be proof that the same, so
offered, are authenticated in the manner required.
71. Id
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
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which tends either to explain the circumstances of the offense, 72 or to
show that he is not the actual person sought by the requesting country.73 The defendant may not present evidence which is generally
exculpatory or which merely contradicts or challenges the veracity of
the prosecution's case,7 4 since such evidence would have no bearing

admission would transform the
on the issue of probable cause and its 75
proceeding into a trial on the merits.

The decision of the court of extradition is final and is not subject to direct appeal to a higher court. 76 Although there is authority
to the effect that the requesting country may, following an adverse
decision, refile its request before a different trial court, 77 this route
adds delay, expense and complication to the process, but does not

bring the case before a higher court for the correction of judicial
errors. 78 As a practical matter, a magistrate's decision against extra-

dition ultimately may terminate the proceeding with no opportunity
79
for meaningful review.
72. See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 315-16 (1922); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S.
447, 462 (1938); Application of D'Amico, supra note 67, at 929-30.
73. See Benson v. MacMahon, supra note 62; and WHITEMAN, supra note 65, at 99899.
74. See Collins v. Loisel, supra note 72, at 315-16; Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d
894, 900-02 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. dismissed, 414 U.S. 884 (1974); and Sindona v. Grant,
supra note 48, at 204-05. In Collins the Court noted that to allow the accused to present
exculpatory evidence:
would give him the option of insisting upon a full hearing and trial of his case
here; and that might compel the demanding government to produce all its evidence here, both direct and rebutting, in order to meet the defense thus gathered
from every quarter. The result would be that the foreign government, though
entitled by the terms of the treaty to the extradition of the accused for the purpose of a trial where the crime was committed, would be compelled to go into a
full trial on the merits in a foreign country, under all the disadvantages of such a
situation, and could not obtain extradition until after it had procured a conviction of the accused upon a full and substantial trial here. This would be in plain
contravention of the intent and meaning of the extradition treaties.
259 U.S. at 316 (quoting from In re Wadge, 15 F. 864, 866 (S.D.N.Y.), afd, 16 F. 332 (2d
Cir. 1883)).
75. See Collins v. Loisel, supra notes 72 and 74; Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447, 461
(1913); Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 900-02 (2d Cir. 1973); Sayne v. Shipley, 418
F.2d 679, 685 (5th Cir. 1969); First National City Bank of New York v. Aristequieta, 287
F.2d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 1960); Desmond v. Eggers, 18 F.2d 503, 505-06 (9th Cir. 1927);
Matter of Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672, 685-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Freedman v. United
States, 437 F. Supp. 1252, 1265 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
76. See United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 125-30 (2d Cir. 1981).
77. See id, at 128; Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1365-66 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 932 (1978); In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); and Exparte
Schorer, 195 F. 334, 337-38 (E.D. Wis. 1912). See also 2 M. BASSIOUNI AND V. NANDA,
A TREATiSE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 367-70 (1973).
78. See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922); Hooker v. Klein, supra note 77; In re
Kelly, 26 F. 852 (8th Cir. 1886); In re Gonzalez, supra note 77; and Exparte Schorer,
supra note 77.
79. See Hearingson S. 1639, supra note 18, at 6 (statement of M. Abbell, Director,
Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division, Department of Justice); at 10 (state-
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The defendant similarly is precluded from taking a direct
appeal from an unfavorable decision, but may seek collateral relief
by filing a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 80 Although such
review is more limited than is a direct appeal, 8 1 it does provide the
defendant with a vehicle for the correction of error that is unavailable to the government. The denial of a Writ of Habeas Corpus is
82
appealable to the higher federal courts.
If the court ultimately authorizes extradition, the Department of
State must decide independently whether to deliver the accused to
the requesting government. 83 The Secretary of State does not make
this decision until the completion of all judicial proceedings, 84 and
has broad discretion to deny extradition based upon the executive's
view of the facts and interpretation of the treaty. 85 The Department
of State generally conducts a de novo examination of the issues and
court proceedings, but is not bound by the judicial record. 86 The
secretary may consider such additional factors as competing requests
from different countries, humanitarian considerations, or public pol87
icy with respect to international relations.
This general procedure, although unnecessarily circuitous, may
be adequate to deal with ordinary cases of extradition for criminal
behavior. Once the political offense exception is raised, however, the
shortcomings of the system become apparent.
B.

THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION

As with the general procedure, the court initially determines the
applicability of the political offense exception. If the court decides in
favor of the extradition request, the Secretary of State may then
ment of D. McGovern, Deputy Legal Advisor, Department of State); at 33 (statement of
W. Hannay, attorney at law).
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1976).
81. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311, 312-13 (1925); Garcia-Guillern v.
United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1191-92 (5th Cir. 1971). See generally I J.B. MOORE,
EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE RENDITION

§§ 350-358 (1891).

82. See United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 128 (2d Cir. 1981). See generally J.B.
MOORE, supra note 81.
83. See 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1976):
"The Secretary of State may order the person committed under Sections 3184 or 3185
of this title to be delivered to any authorized agent of such foreign government to be tried
for the offense of which charged."
84. See 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 334 (1944) (citing a

memoradum from counselor Anderson of the Department of State to Secretary of State
Knox, February 1912, Department of State file 211.42R67116).
85. See Note, Executive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 1313, 1323
(1962); G. HACKWORTH, supra note 84, at § 334.
86. Id
87. See Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 18, at 133-39 (Department of State Memorandum of Decision in the case of the Request by the State of Israel for the Extradition of
Ziyad Abu Eain).
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review the determination;88 however, if the magistrate concludes that
the political offense exception obtains, then extradition is denied and
the requesting country is foreclosed from pursuing an appeal.89
Thus, the lowest ranking officer in the federal judiciary is empowered to make a decision which is binding upon the conduct of United
States foreign affairs and immune from review by a higher court.
This odd rule appears to have arisen virtually by accident, 90 but
it is unquestionably the current law in the United States. 91 The origin of the rule of non-appealability lies in the relationship between
extradition and domestic criminal procedure. Extradition proceedings are preliminary in nature and are analogous to the preliminary
hearing in a criminal case. 92 Since the general standard of proof is
only "probable cause," the ruling is not deemed a final one and is
not given the effect of resjudicata.93 Consequently, although the
requesting government is free to refile its complaint before a different magistrate, no appeal may be taken. This approach corresponds
directly to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 94 and it is certainly adequate to deal with the "criminal law" aspects of extradition
which are preliminary to the ultimate trial on guilt or innocence.
The magistrate's ruling on the political offense exception, however, is the ultimate decision on that issue. The magistrate makes
88. See generall, United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
89. After careful review of the legislative and judicial history of current United
States extradition law, Judge Friendly concluded, "we think it clear that no appeal lies
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 from the Magistrate's decision here." United States v. Mackin,
supra note 88, at 130.
90. The non-appealability of orders granting or denying extradition requests is generally believed to have originated with In re Metzger, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176 (1847). The
case was decided by a district judge in his chambers, and it was held that the law made
no provision for review of the special authority exercised by a judge, not sitting in court.
Subsequently, a new extradition law was passed, that law was the predecessor to the
current extradition law of the United States. Neither the new law nor its legislative history, however, shows any intention to alter the Metzger decision with respect to reviewability, and the doctrine of non-appealability of judicial extradition decision became
entrenched in United States law. See United States v. Mackin, supra note 88, at 125.
91. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. But see supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text (the defendant may file a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and the
requesting state may refile its request before a different court).
92. See Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); and Benson v. MacMahon, 127 U.S.
457 (1888).
93. See Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309 (1922); United States v. Mackin, supra note
88, at 128; Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1366-68 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 932
(1978); In re Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); and Exparte Schorer, 195 F.
334 (E.D. Wis. 1912).
94. Fed A Crim. . 5.1(6) provides:
Discharge of Defendant: If from the evidence it appears that there is no probable cause to believe that an Offense has been committed or that the defendant
committed it, the federal magistrate shall dismiss the complaint and discharge
the defendant. The discharge of the defendant shall not preclude the government from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
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findings of fact and conclusions of law which are not preliminary to
those of any other forum; the standard of proof employed is at least
the "preponderance of the evidence" test rather than merely a probable cause standard. 95 The magistrate's hearing on the political
offense exception is nothing less than a full-scale trial on that issue.
The decision is non-appealable only because of its role in the extradition process, but the policy reasons precluding the appeal of preliminary evidentiary findings simply do not apply to the political
offense question. It can only be seen as an historical accident that
the two aspects of extradition-proof of the crime versus the political
nature of the offense-have not been separated procedurally so as to
96
allow direct appeal of the political offense decision.
The difficulty created by the lack of appellate review is compounded by the inadequate substantive and procedural guidelines
available to federal magistrates. The United States cases apply the
outmoded "incidence test" as the substantive rule governing the
political offense exception.97 In addition, the current law neither
specifies the party on whom the burden of proof rests nor defines the
standard of proof that must be met in order for the party with the
burden to prevail.
The "incidence test," first enunciated in 1891 in the British case
In re Castioni,98 provides that a crime is not subject to extradition if
it was committed in furtherance of a political rising or disturbance. 99
This emphasis on the existence of a rising or rebellion has resulted in
a rule which is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. The tradi95. See Lubet and Czaczkes, The Role ofthe American Judiciaryin the Extraditionof

PoliticalTerrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 208-09 (1980). See also In re
Gonzalez, 217 F. Supp. 717, 719-20 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); and In re Abu Eain, Magis. No. 79
M 175, at 19-21 (N.D. Ill., opinion filed Dec. 18, 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
96. In United States v. Mackin, supra note 88, at 129, the United States government
sought to appeal the Magistrate's decision, which held that Mackin's offense was of a
political nature and therefore non-extraditable. The court rejected the contention of the
government, noting that "when Congress has desired to permit an appeal from a decision
of a magistrate directly to a court of appeals, it has said so."
97. See, e.g., Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502, 509 (1896); Abu Fain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d
504, 518-23 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); United States v. Mackin,
supra note 88, at 130-37; Peroff v. Hylton, 542 F.2d 1247, 1249 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977); Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1192 (5th
Cir. 1971); Jiminez v. Aristequieta, 311 F.2d 547, 558-60 (1962), af'dpercuriamsubnom.
Jiminez v. Hixon, 314 F.2d 654 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963); United States
ex rel Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 459, 460-61 (S.D. Fla. 1959); In re Ezeta, 62
F. 972, 997-1004 (N.D. Cal. 1894); and In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1899 M.G. (N.D. Cal.,
memorandum decision filed May 11, 1979).
98. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
99. Sir Charles Russell, Q.C., adopted the definition suggested by John Stuart Mill:
An offense of a political character is "[amny offense committed in the course of or furthering of civil war, insurrection, or political commotions." In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. 149,
153 (as quoted in E. CLARKE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EXTRADITION Appendix,
CCIX (3rd ed. 1886)).
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tional test is under-inclusive in that it appears to exclude from pro-

tection all political offenses which were not part of a general rising or
rebellion. The over-inclusive aspect of the test is that it lays the

framework for the claim that all acts committed during times of
political disorder, without regard to the character or victim of the
crime, should be insulated from extradition. 100

The mechanical application of the Castionitest has led to results
which commentators have called cruel and insane.' 0 ' In the mid1950's the Yugoslavian government sought the extradition of
Andrija Artukovic, the former minister of internal affairs in the proNazi government of Croatia during World War II, on the charge
that he had ordered the murder of 200,000 inmates of Yugoslavian
concentration camps.' 0 2 The indictment specifically accused
Artukovic of issuing "orders based on criminal motives, hatred, and
the desire for power to members of bands . . . to carry out mass
slaughters of the peaceful civilian population."'' 0 3 Three separate
federal courts, however, determined the offenses charged to be
"political" on the ground that they had occurred during the German
invasion of Yugoslavia and the subsequent establishment of the
short-lived independent government of Croatia.10 4 The courts specifically declined to rule that war crimes against civilians were
beyond the purview of the Castioni test, 05 simply because the
offenses were committed in the course of a struggle for political
power., o6

A similar analysis recently led a United States magistrate to
conclude that "[e]ven though the offense be deplorable and heinous,
the criminal actor will be excluded from [extradition] if the crime is
committed under these pre-requisites."' 10 7 Thus, the Castioni test,
carried to its "insane but logical" end, 0 8 would appear to protect

terrorists from extradition. Such a result virtually is unavoidable
100. See Lubet and Czaczkes, supra note 95, at 201-06.
101. See Hearingson S. 1639, supra note 18, at 40 (statement of W. Hannay, attorney
at law) ("absurdity and ultimate cruelty of applying" the Castioni test).
102. See Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956), af'd sub nom.
Karadzole v. Artukovic, 242 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), rev'dper curiam, 355 U.S. 393
(1958), decision on remandsub nom United States ex rel. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 170 F.
Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
103. 24 F.2d at 204. The events took place in 1941 and 1942 when Yugoslavia was
occupied by German and Italian troops. Id
104. 140 F. Supp. at 246-47; 247 F.2d at 204-05; and 170 F. Supp. at 392-94.
105. 140 F. Supp. at 246-47; 247 F.2d at 204-05; and 170 F. Supp. at 392-94.
106. 170 F. Supp. at 393.
107. In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1899 M.G. (N.D. Cal., memorandum decision filed
May 11, 1979), reprintedin Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 18, at 294.
108. See Hearingson S. 1639, supra note 18, at 55-56 (statement of W. Hannay, attorney at law) (The Castioni test "more often leads courts away from the right result than
towards it.").
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when the courts apply a test that focuses on the context of the crime
as opposed to the content of the act. The British courts doubtless
recognized this problem, as they have departed from the Castionitest
to the point of virtual abandonment.'0 9 Unfortunately, the courts of
the United States, in the absence of guiding legislation, have failed
to keep pace with the realities of the modern world in the substantive
development of the political offense doctrine." 0
The Castioni test, despite its inadequacies and pitfalls, is nonetheless an accepted rule of law which is capable of analysis and
application; it is useful as a benchmark for courts to guide their substantive understanding of the political offense exception. No such
benchmark exists, however, with regard to the procedure for considering the exception. There is no statutory treatment of the issue, and
the courts have not developed a uniform process to govern the manner in which the political offense exception may be raised, or the
standard under which it is to be determined."'
The procedural concept of burden of proof may be divided into
three components: burden of production, burden of persuasion, and
standard of proof. 12 The allocation of the burden of production
controls which party is obliged to present evidence first on a given
point of law," 3 and the assignment of the burden of persuasion
determines which party ultimately must convince the trier of fact." 14
Finally, the standard of proof sets the level of certainty which must
be met met in order for the party with the ultimate burden to
prevail.'15
In criminal cases, the general rule is that the defendant bears the
109. Id at 55 ("England does little more than pay lip service to the Castioni rule.").
For example, in 1954 the British courts applied the political offense exception in the
absence of a political disturbance in the requesting country. Seven crew members of a
Polish fishing trawler who had taken control of their boat from a communist crew in
international waters were granted asylum. Regina v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex
parte Kolczynski, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540 (1954).
110. In Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504,519-21 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.denied, 454 U.S.
894 (1981), the court held that the killing and maiming of children in a crowded Israeli
marketplace could not be considered a political offense, but the court based the holding,
at least in part, on the ground that the evidence had failed to show "a direct tie between
the [Palestine Liberation Organization] and the specific violence alleged. Id at 520.
Though the court arrived at the praiseworthy conclusion that "the indiscriminate bombing of a civilian populace is not recognized as a protected political act," id at 521, the
court nevertheless felt contrained to mold its analysis to the limitations imposed by the
Castionirule. Id at 519-21.
111. See generally Lubet and Czaczkes, supra note 95, at 206-10.
112. See generaly Allen, Presumptions,Inferences and Burden ofProofinFederalCivil
Actions, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 892, 895-901 (1982).
113. Id at 895.
114. Id
115. Id
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burden of production for any affirmative defense. 1 6 In some extradition cases, however, the courts have required the requesting country to establish in the initial requisition that the offense charged was
7
not political. 11
Furthermore, even those courts holding that the initial burden is on the defendant have disagreed as to the quantum of
evidence that is necessary to satisfy the burden of production. Some
courts have required substantial expert testimony concerning the
surrounding political situation,"18 while others have required only
the assertion of the defense." I9
The cases show a similar confusion concerning the burden of
persuasion. In Ramos v. Diaz,120 for example, the court held that
"when evidence offered before the Court tends to show that the
offenses charged against the accused are of a political character, the
burden rests on the demanding government to prove to the contrary."' 2 ' This is clearly a defense-oriented approach, as the "tending to show" standard would require the requesting country, in
116. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.
117. This approach was adopted by both the district court and the court of appeals in
Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956), affd sub nom. Karadzole v.
Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), supra note 102. The Supreme Court ultimately
rejected the approach in reversing per curiam, 355 U.S. 393 (1958).
118. See, e.g., In re Abu Fain, Magis. No. 79 M 175 W.D. Ill., (opinion filed Dec. 18,
1979), afdsub nom. Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 894 (1981). The magistrate's opinion is reprinted in the Brief for Appellant at
Appendix G, Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
119. The court in Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459, 463 (S.D. Fla. 1959), followed the
approach that requires only the assertion of the defense: "American authority indicates
clearly that when evidence offered before the Court tends to show that the offenses
charged against the accused are of a political character, the burden rests upon the
demanding government to prove the contrary." Id. (citing 2 C.C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 1025
(1951)). The court apparently shifted the burden to the requesting country based on the
testimony of the defendants relating to their membership in a revolutionary movement at
the time of the alleged crime.
The only major dialogue on the issue of burden of proof in extradition cases occurred
before the American Society of International Law in 1909. 1909 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L
L. 95-165. Two experts on extradition reached opposite conclusions based on policy
considerations. J.R. Clark, Jr., a solicitor with the Department of State, argued that the
accused bore the burden of raising and proving the political offense defense by a preponderance of the evidence. His opinion was based on general principles involved in the
pleading ofjurisdictional issues and the fact that the defense ran to the jurisdiction of the
court in a habeas corpus proceedings. Id at 95-124. On the other hand, J.W. Mack, a
practitioner, argued that raising the political offense exception went to the merits of the
extradition request, and once raised by the introduction of some evidence by the accused,
the burden shifted to the requesting country to show that the act was a common crime by
some unspecified standard of proof. Thus, it was Mack's position, at that time, that the
underlying policy of the political offense exception, namely, the promotion of political
change, required that special protection be afforded to anyone claiming to fall under the
exception, as long as some political rationale could be applied under domestic law. Id at
144-65.
120. 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959).
121. Id at 463. See supra note 119.
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almost every case, to disprove the political nature of any charged
122
offense, presumably by at least a preponderance of the evidence.
More recently, the court in Abu Eain v. Wilkes held that the
burden of persuasion rested on the defense to establish facts that
brought the specific crime within the ambit of the political offense
exception.1 23 To meet this burden, the defendant would have to
adduce evidence showing a "direct link between the perpetrator, 24a
political organization's political goals and the specific act."'
Although this decision represents the modem trend, 125 the courts
in adopting a clear rule governing the
have been far from unanimous
126
burden of persuasion.
Finally, questions regarding the applicable standard of proof
have received scant attention. Those decisions that have addressed
the issue generally have utilized the "preponderance of the evidence" standard, 127 but most courts have issued their rulings without
128
discussing the standard of proof.
122. See Ramos v. Diaz, supra notes 119-21, at 463. The requesting country in an

extradition hearing only bears the burden of showing probable cause, as the ultimate
issue of guilt or innocence is not under consideration by the extraditing court. See supra
notes 66-67 and accompanying text. At the same time, however, the court does resolve
the merits of the political offense exception issue. In order for the court to reach a decision, one party or the other must establish its case by the greater weight of the evidence.
See also In re Abu Eain, supra note 118. In his habeas corpus brief to the Seventh
Circuit, Abu Eain argued that he had met the "tending to show" standard by presenting
evidence of the general tactics of the Palestine Liberation Organization. He had offered
evidence at trial that bombings directed as Israeli civilians were "typical and common"
undertakings of the P.L.O., but he did not testify himself and he did not offer any evidence concerning the motivation behind the specific bombing with which he was
charged. Brief for Appellant at 25-29, Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
On this basis Abu Eain argued that the requesting state was required to disprove that the
charged murders were political crimes. Id at 29.
123. 641 F.2d 504, 520-21 (7th Cir. 1981).
124. Id at 521.
125. See In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1,45-46 (S.D.N.Y., opinion filed August 13),
aft'd, United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). The magistrate's opinion is
reprinted in Hearings on S.1639, supra note 18, at 140.

126. Id See also In re Abu Eain, supra note 118; and In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1899
M.G. (N.D. Cal., memorandum decision filed May 11, 1979).
127. See, e.g., In re Mackin, supra note 125, at 45-46.
128. The magistrate noted in In re Mackin, id, that neither Abu Eain v. Wilkes, supra
note 123, nor In re McMullen, supra note 126, is helpful in establishing the requisite
burden and standard of proof. The Abu Eain court, while requiring the defendant to
show a link between the act charged and the political objective, did not explicitly overrule the "tends to show" standard enunciated in Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459, 463
(S.D. Fla. 1959).
The McMullen court also complicated the issue by articulating two different standards
of proof. The court found that the respondent had met its burden of establishing each
element of the political offense exception, then concluded that this government had failed
to meet its burden of presenting contradicting evidence. This would seem to indicate that
a defendant only need introduce evidence which "tends to show" the political nature of
the crime for the burden to shift to the government. In re McMullen, supra note 126, at 5.
In the following paragraph the court implied that the applicability of the political excep-
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The foregoing overview of the process for determining the
extradition question in the United States illustrates the need for a

clear legislative response to the present inadequacies in the substantive and procedural law. 129 The following section analyzes the pro-

posed responses to the problems and recommends an extradition
process that preserves the strengths of United States tradition and
satisfies the requirements of the contemporary environment.
III
EXTRADITION REFORM
The call for statutory reform of the extradition law of the
United States has met with no dissent. Academics, practitioners,
government officers and other interested observers agree that the
entire extradition process must be reformed both for the benefit of
the government, future defendants, and the vitality of the political

offense exception.

30

The commentators are nearly unanimous on

the need for several technical changes in the law. Thus, it is nearly

certain that any legislative reform will abolish the rule of nonappealability.' 3 ' In the future, both the defendant and the prosecu-

tion will be able to appeal decisions directly. It also appears that
extradition hearings will be held exclusively in the federal courts,
and that at least important cases will be removed from the magis32
trates to full district court judges.
The consideration of the political offense exception, however,
has stirred considerable controversy. The proposed changes in the
treatment of the exception raise three principal questions: (1) How
shall "political offense" be defined; (2) How shall the burden of
proof be allocated; and (3) Should the political offense determination
tion must be established by a preponderance of evidence. Id at 6. See also Abu Eain v.
Wilkes, supra note 123 at 520.
129. See supra notes 31-50 and accompanying text (citing executive disapproval of
recent extradition proceedings as impetus for reform).
130. See Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 18, at 20 (statement of M.C. Bassiouri, professor, School of Law, De Paul University); at 69 (statement of W.M. Goodman, attorney
at law); at 86 (statement of R.T. Capulong, chairperson of the Human Rights Committee
of the Philippine-American Lawyers Association of New York, dated Dec. 5, 1981); at 4
(statement of M. Abbel, director, Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice); and at 89 (statement of the American Civil Liberties Union,
Letter dated Dec. 8, 1981).
131. The three versions of extradition reform under legislative consideration are: H.R.
6046, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); S. 1940, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); and S. 1639, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See also 127 CONG. REc. S9960-S9961, § 3195 (daily ed. Sept.
18, 1981); S. REP. No. 475, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 21, § 3195 (1982); and H.R. REP. No.
627, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 § 3195 (1982).
132. See S. REP. No. 475, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 16-7, § 3192 (1982); and H.R. REP. No.
637, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-12 (1982).

268

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

be removed from the courts?

33

[Vol. 15:247

Although the abolition of the judi-

cial role has been the most controversial proposal of the three, the
definitional and procedural questions may prove to be equally

important in the long run. Furthermore, the satisfactory resolution
of the definitional and procedural problems in the law could be
determinative of congressional willingness to leave the political
offense question in the hands of the judiciary.

A.

THE DEFINITION OF A POLITICAL OFFENSE

The extradition reform bills presented to Congress define polit-

ical offenses by exclusion. 34 These definitions follow identical patterns and state that an offense of a political character "normally"'' 35
does not include:
(A) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at The Hague on December 16, 1970;
(B) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on
September 23, 1971;
(C) a serious offense involving an attack against the life, physical integrity,
or liberty or internationally protected persons (as defined in section 1116 of
this title), including diplomatic agents;
(D) an offense with respect to which a treaty obligates the United States to
either extradite or prosecute a person accused of the offense;
(E) an offense that consists of homicide, assault with intent to commit serious bodily injury, rape, kidnapping, the taking of a hostage, or serious
unlawful detention;
(F) an offense involving the use of a firearm (as such term is defined in
section 921 of this title) if such use endangers a person other than the
offender,
(G) an offense that consists of the manufacture, importation, distribution,
or sale of narcotics or dangerous drugs; or
133. See S.1639, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 3194, 3196 (1981); S.1940, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. §§ 3194, 3196 (1982); and H.R. 6046, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 3194, 3196, 3199
(1982).
134. S.1639, supra note 133, does not contain a definition, because, under the bill, the
determination of the political offense exception would not be made by the courts. S.
1940, supra note 133, defines political offenses by exclusion in § 3194(e). H.R. 6046,
supra note 113, defines political offenses by exclusion in § 3194(e)(2). See infra notes
135-36 and accompanying text.
135. The language in each proposed definition varies only in minor aspects. Prior to
amendment, S.1940, supra note 133, provided the exclusions quoted in the text accompanying infra note 136. Amended S.1940 § 3194(e) contains two subsections: (1) subsection
one states that "a political offense does not include" provisions A, B, C, D, and G in text
accompanying infra note 136; (2) subsection two states that "a political offense, except in
extraordinary circumstances, does not include" provisions E and F in text accompanying
infra note 136. Both subsections include a provision similar to H in the text accompanying infra note 136. The amended version of S.1940, unlike the other proposed definitions, does not state that an offense of a political character "normally" does not include
the particular crimes in provisions A, B, C, D, and G in text accompanying infra note
136. H.R. 6046, supra note 133, uses the language "except in extraordinary circumstances" in lieu of "normally."
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(H) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in clauses (A)
through (G) of this subparagraph, or participation as an accomplice of a per136
son who commits, attempts, or conspires to commit such an offense.

The reticence of the drafters to define the term political offense
in a comprehensive manner indicates their recognition of the impossibility inherent in that task. In an area as volatile and diverse as

international violence there can be no single test or rule which meaningfully and reliably defines a "political offense." It is possible to

define what a political offense is not, however, through the process of
excluding that conduct which is unacceptable, regardless of its moti137
vation or context.
The first four proposed exclusions essentially codify existing
obligations under a variety of international conventions.' 38 These
exclusions represent a strong international consensus that crimes
such as aircraft hijacking, 139 hostage taking, 140 and attacks on diplo-

mats141 cannot be shielded from prosecution. This approach, which
also was taken in the 1977 European Convention on The Suppres-

sion of Terrorism, 142 avoids the overinclusiveness of the Castioni
136. See S. REP. No. 331, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1982). For the minor changes in
the amended version of S.1940, supra note 133, see S. REP. No. 475, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
19-20 (1982). For the similar language in H.R. 6046, supra note 133, see H.R. REP. No.
627, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49 (1982).
137. See Hearingson S.1639, supra note 18, at 57 (statement of W. Hannay, attorney
at law). On definitions by exclusion see Summers, The GeneralDuty of Good Faith-Its
Recognition and Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 810, 818-20 (1982); and Summers, "GoodFaith'inGeneralContractLaw and the Sales Provisionsof the Uniform CommercialCode, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (explains the use of "excluder" conceptualizations, and
applies that analysis to a defense of the definition of "good faith" by exclusion in general
contract law and the Uniform Commercial Code).
138. See Convention on Offenses and certain other Acts committed on Board Aircraft,
Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704 U.N.T.S. 220; Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641,
T.I.A.S. No. 7192; Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of
Civil Aviation (Sabotage), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S. No. 7570; Convention
on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons,
Including Diplomatic Agents, Dec. 14, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532; and
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, G.A. Res. 34/146, 34 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 245, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/146 (1979).
139. See Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, supra note 138, ch. VI, art. 16; Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, supra note 138, art. 8; Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation (Sabotage), supra note 138, art. 8.
140. See International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, supra note 138,
arts. 8-10.
141. See Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, supra note 138, art. 8.
142. 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976). Article 1 provides:
For the purposes of extradition between Contracting States, none of the following offences shall be regarded as a political offence or as an offence connected
with a political offence or as an offence inspired by political motives:
a. An offence within the scope of the convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, signed at the Hague on 16 December 1970;
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test, 143 at least with regard to those offenses which, due to current or
future treaties, obligate the United States either to extradite or prosecute the accused. 44
Two of the subsequent exclusions, which are not treaty-related,
are far too restrictive in limiting the availability of the political
offense exception. Sections (E) and (F) exclude all offenses involving
the use of a firearm, homicide, assault with intent to commit serious
bodily injury, kidnapping, and serious unlawful detention. Under
certain circumstances, courts previously applied the relative political
offense doctrine to precisely these types of offenses. 145 Accordingly,
the exclusionary definition in these sections represents a substantial
departure from prior law and interpretation of the political offense
exception.
Without question, this approach excludes virtually all acts of
terrorism from the ambit of the political offense exception. It also
offers the benefit of simple application. A rule that excludes all
crimes of violence from the political offense exception will make it
possible to apply the exception based upon nothing more than an
examination of the underlying complaint. It will become unnecessary for any court to hold a hearing on the political offense question,
since the exception never would apply to any situation that also
involves the charge of a violent crime. Thus, had the proposed rule
been applied to the Abu Eain, McMullen, and Mackin cases,146 all of
which required lengthy evidentiary hearings, each could have been
b. an offence within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, signed at Montreal on 23 September 1971;
c. a serious offence involving an attack against the life, physical integrity or
liberty of internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents;
d. an offence involving kidnapping, the taking of a hostage or serious unlawful
detention;
e. an offence involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, automatic firearm or
letter or parcel bomb if this use endangers persons;
f. an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offences or participation as an
accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offence.
Id See also 16 I.L.M. 233 (1977) (noting that the convention was signed on Jan. 27, 1977
by seventeen countries).
143. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., S.1940, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3196(a)(3): "A political offense or an
offense of a political character normally does not include ... (D) an offense with respect

to which a treaty obligates the United States to either extradite or prosecute a person
accused of the offense."
145. See, e.g., In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y., opinion filed August 13),
af'd, United States v. Mackin, 688 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re McMullen, No. 3-781899 M.G. (N.D. Cal., memorandum decision filed May 11, 1979); Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F.
Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959); In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894); Regina v. Governor
of Brixton Prison, exparte Kulczynski, [1955] 1 Q.B. 540 (1954); and In re Castioni,
[1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
146. See infra notes 147-49.
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decided without trial at least with regard to the political offense
question. Abu Eain was charged with placing a bomb which killed
two children, 147 Mackin was charged with shooting a British policeman, 148 and McMullen was charged with the bombing of an army
barracks in which a charwoman was killed. 149 Under the proposed
violent crimes exclusion, none of these three defendants could have
claimed the protection of the political offense exception, and indeed,
no hearings would have been necessary to determine the inapplicability of the defense.
The problem with this exclusion of all violent offenses is that it
sweeps too broadly and denies the protection of the political offense
exception to some offenders the United States might wish, and
indeed ought, to protect. The evolution of the political offense
exception reveals a clear intent to apply the doctrine to at least some
persons sought for violent acts committed in the course of rebellion
or revolution. 50 Although the value-free application of the protection to heinous acts committed in the name of a political cause carries the concept too far,15 ' it is nonetheless possible to shape an
approach which excludes random terror, but which will not require
the extradition of legitimate rebels against a tyrannical government.
It is conceivable, for example, that one of the detained leaders of
Poland's Solidarity movement might have escaped to the West using
a firearm in the course of evading his captors. The United States
would not wish to return a fugitive for trial under these circumstances. A carefully drafted requisition pursuant to the United
States-Poland Treaty of Extradition,1 52 however, coupled with the
proposed "firearm exclusion," legally could compel rendition.
A better resolution of the definitional problem is to focus upon
the nature of the violent activity charged, rather than upon the fact
that violence of a specified type was involved. To effect this alternative focus, the definition could incorporate the existing legal notion
that acts aimed against civilians, rather than at installations of gov147. Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981), af7'g, In re Abu Eain,
Magis. No. 79 M 175 (N.D. III., opinion filed Dec. 18, 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981).
148. United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir.), ajft'g In re Mackin, No. 80
Cr. Misc. I (S.D.N.Y., opinion filed August 13, 1981).
149. In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1899 M.G. (N.D. Cal., memorandum decision filed
May 11, 1979), reprinted in Hearingson S.1639, supra note 18, at 294.
150. See Lubet and Czaczkes, supra note 4, at 194.
151. See, e.g., In re McMullen, supra note 149; and Artukovic v. Boyle, supra notes
102-06 and accompanying text.
152. Treaty of Extradition, Apr. 5, 1935, United States-Poland, 46 Stat. 2282, T.S. No.
908.
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eminent, are not political offenses. 153 An additional subsection
might be drafted to exclude from the definition of a political offense:
( ) an offense involving an attack against the life, physical integrity or liberty of any civilian or non-combatant; or an offense, comprising an act or
acts of violence or a conspiracy or attempt to perform an act or acts of violence, which is intended to, or has the principal effect of, creating fear, terror,
or disruption among the civilian populace, or which has the principal effect
of disrupting the social order.

Such a provision would exclude terrorist activities such as the bombing of public places, kidnapping, and other acts of social disruption
that are directed solely at the civilian populace. The decision-maker,
however, would retain the ability to extend the protection of the
exception to legitimate rebels or actual contenders in a struggle for
national power.
One commentator noted that the specific exclusion of crimes
against civilians from the ambit of the political offense exception
may have the undesirable effect of sanctioning political murder
"merely because the victim wears a uniform,"' 154 and cautioned
against the adoption of a law that declares "open season on soldiers"
and police.' 55 There remains a distinction, however, between murder and rebellion when the victim is an armed officer of the state.' 56
No United States law defines the difference between crime and
revolution, and the recent extradition cases offer little assistance in
resolving the problem. The international law of war, however, seeks
to distinguish precisely between privileged acts of combat and punishable atrocities or war crimes. Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions contains the list of "grave breaches" of the humanitarian
rules of war for which individual soldiers may be subjected to trial or
extradition. 57
The International Law Association's Committee on International Terrorism suggested that, although the law of armed conflict
does not apply to those acts commonly considered to comprise international terrorism, the jurisprudence of war could be extended by
153. See Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 520-523 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Meunier,
[1894] 2 Q.B. 415. Cf In re Ezeta, 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894). (San Salvador requested
that its former President, Antonio Ezeta, and four of his military officers be extradited
from the United States to stand trial for crimes Ezeta and his officers committed while
attempting to maintain their government against the revolutionary forces that eventually
overthrew them. The trial court held that all but one of the alleged crimes were political
because they occurred during a period of armed rebellion. The one crime ruled not
political involved the attempted murder of a civilian.)
154. Hearings on S.1639, supra note 18, at 55 (testimony of W. Hannay, attorney at
law).
155. Id
156. See, e.g., In re Ezeta, supra note 153.
157. Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 6 U.S.T. 3516, No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
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analogy to develop the humanitarian law of international violence.
Since the parties to the Geneva conventions voluntarily bound their
armed forces to a code of conduct, there is no reason to insulate
insurrectionists or other groups from the punishment to which
soldiers may be subjected. 158 The committee's Fourth Interim
Report reasoned: "[T]here is no reason in theory or practice why
states should be willing to concede to politically motivated foreigners
a license to commit atrocities while saddling their own organized
armed forces with the restraints contained in the 1949 Geneva conventions against committing the same atrocities."'' 5 9
Thus, the committee concluded that the humanitarian law
requiring states to cooperate in the suppression of war crimes should
apply with equal force to similar acts committed by persons not entitled to the soldiers' privilege. 160 The committee proposed that no
person should be permitted to escape trial or extradition on the
ground of political motivation, if the same acts, performed by a soldier engaged in an international armed conflict, would subject the
6
soldier to trial or extradition.' '
The committee's formulation, if adopted, would draw a bright
line between acts of actual insurrection and random assaults by
politically disaffected individuals. This approach, however, would
be useful only as the definition of a lower limit for the protection of
political violence. Standing alone, it would appear to invest every
terrorist with the privileges normally reserved for organized combatants. Since it is necessary to hold self-styled revolutionaries to a
standard higher than that allowed to soldiers, it is essential that the
"rules of war" test be employed only in conjunction with defined
statutory exclusions from the political offense exception.
In summary, the definitional approach to the political offense
exception contained in the proposed reform bills is admirable both
in its departure from the Castioni test and its attempt to exclude terrorists from political sanctuary. The exclusion of virtually all violent
acts from the protection of the political offense exception, however,
is too restrictive and threatens to require the extradition of legitimate
dissidents. The definition would be strengthened if it were to eliminate the blanket exclusion of all violent acts, and focus instead on
crimes against civilians and those that, by analogy, violate the law of
war.
158.
11.
159.
160.
161.

Committee on International Terrorism, 4th Interim Report, 1981, INT'L L.A. 10Id at 11.
Id at 11-12.
Id at 12.
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PROCEDURE AND BURDEN OF PROOF

The rules that govern the manner in which the political offense
exception is to be raised and determined are of the utmost importance. Must the defendant assert and prove, by whatever standard,
that his offense was political, or must the requesting country prove
that it was not? Although the answer to this question may often be
outcome determinative, the United States cases have not provided a
consistent approach to the problem. 162 Similarly, and inexplicably,
the original extradition reform bills also ignored the burden of proof
issue. 63 Through the process of public hearing and committee
deliberation, however, two distinct proposals have emerged to govern the procedure for asserting the political offense exception.
House of Representatives Bill 6046 contains a bifurcated hearing procedure under which the presiding judge would not hear evidence on the political offense question unless and until the court
determined that the defendant was otherwise extraditable.'6 This is
a reasonable measure aimed at conserving judicial resources. It
surely would serve no purpose to conduct a lengthy and complicated
hearing on the political offense exception, only to determine later
that there was insufficient evidence linking the defendant to the
crime, 165 or that the applicable statute of limitations had already
passed. 66 This approach is also contained in Senate Bill 1940 pro67
posed by the Committee on Foreign Relations.
Once the political offense issue is ripe for adjudication, there is
agreement among the proposals that the defendant must bear the
burden of proof. 68 Although the legislation does not divide this
concept into its "production" and "persuasion" aspects, 169 it is clear
that the intent of the drafters is to require the defendant both to raise
the defense through the production of evidence and ultimately to
70
persuade the trier of fact of its applicability.
162. See supra notes 112-28 and accompanying text.
163. See S. 1639, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); and H.R. 5227, 97th Cong., Ist Sess.

(1981).
164. H.R. 6046, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., §3194(e)(1)(B) (1982).
165. See, e.g., id at § 3194(d)(1)(A-C); and supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
166. See, e.g., H.R. 6046, supra note 164, at § 3194(d)(2)(A).
167. See S. REP. No. 475, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 20, § 3194(0(2) (1982).
168. Id at 19, § 3194(e); and H.R. 6046, supra note 164, at § 3194(d)(2)(c).
169. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
170. See S. REP. No. 475, supra note 167, at 9: "Shifting the burden of the proof to
the person seeking application of the political offense exception reinforces the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee's belief that its legitimate application should be infrequent
and also in accords [sic] with the guidelines established in section 3194(e)(1) and (2),"
which provides that for crimes involving the use of firearms, explosives or violent behavior, a person resisting extradition must satisfy a higher standard by demonstrating
extraordinary circumstances. H.R. 6046, supra notes 164, 168, also contemplates that the
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The placement of the full burden of proof on the person seeking
the benefit of the political offense exception will add both regularity
and predictability to the extradition process. This approach will
resolve the conflict between the Diaz andAbu Eain cases, 17 1 and will
eliminate the possibility that some court will refuse to extradite an

which "tended to
admitted terrorist solely on the basis of evidence
72

show" that the charged offense was political.
As a matter of judicial policy, the political offense exception
should be viewed in the same manner as an affirmative defense. The
party pleading the exception has put forward an affirmative claim

that seeks to avoid the consequence of an otherwise valid extradition
request. Since this matter is new to the proceeding, affirmative in

nature, and comes from beyond the four comers of the requisition
the party that raises
for extradition, it is a reasonable conclusion that
173
it.
establish
to
one
the
be
also
must
the claim

Practical considerations also mandate placing the burden on the
party pleading the exception. Political motivation is a necessary,
though not sufficient, condition for the invocation of the political
offense exception. Consequently, the applicability of the exception
will rest at least in part upon an evaluation of the goals, affiliations,
activities and principles of the defendant. 17 4 Only the defendant can
defendant must raise and establish that the offense charged is of a political character.
See H.R. REP. No. 627, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1982):
This approach also recognized that proof of whether particular conduct is a
political offense generally involves introduction of some evidence that is usually
within the unique knowledge of the person being sought. For example, the political connection that the conduct had with internal strife within the requesting
state may be best known to the person being sought.
171. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text (Ramos v. Diaz used a "tended to
show" standard, while Abu Eain v. Wilkes placed the full burden of persuasion on the
defendant.).
172. Id
173. In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-11 (1977), the Supreme Court recognized that the burden of establishing an affirmative defense may involve questions of
policy rather than questions of fundamental fairness and constitutional rights. See generall, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 337 (2d ed. 1972). The
Patterson court held that, because, in a prosecution for second degree murder, the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance does not serve to negate any facts of the
crime charged, but rather constitutes a collateral issue involving facts beyond the elements of the crime, a state may require the defendant to carry the burden of persuasion
on that issue. 432 U.S. at 201-16. See also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952); and
United States v. Braver, 450 F.2d 799, 801-02 (2d Cir. 1971) (allocation of the burden of
proof on the issue of inducement when a defendant asserts the defense of entrapment to a
criminal charge). The British courts require the defendant to establish the political character of the crime. See, eg., Schtraks v. Government of Israel, [1961] 3 All E.R. 529,
534.
174. See Schtraks v. Government of Israel, supra note 173, at 540, where Viscount
Radcliff states: "In my opinion the idea that lies behind the phrase offense of a political
character is that the fugitive is at odds with the state that applies for his extradition on
some issue connected with the political control or government of the country."
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produce evidence of his political motivation, and conversely, it is virtualy impossible for the requesting country to provide evidence that
a defendant was apolitical. Placing the burden on the requesting
country would call for the proof of a negative, a task which in other
contexts universally is seen as overwhelmingly difficult, if not
17
impossible.
The practical difficulty involved in placing the ultimate burden
of proof on any party other than the defendant is illustrated by an
example drawn from the Abu Eain case.176 It was Abu Eain's claim
that once he provided evidence which "tended to show" that the
crimes with which he was charged were political, the burden of proof
shifted to the prosecution to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the offenses were not political. Following this construction, he claimed that he had met his burden by showing that
bombings directed at Israeli civilians were "typical and common"
undertakings of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Although
Abu Eain neither testified nor offered any evidence concerning the
motivations behind the specific bombings, he claimed on the basis of
this "typicality," that the government was required to disprove the
political nature of the crimes. 177 The government, of course, had no
ability to provide such evidence, beyond a description of the crime
itself. Indeed, it is virtually impossible to conceive of the form that
such proof might take. How could the government of Israel or the
United States prove that certain crimes were not secretly political?
Arguably, if such a burden were to be placed on the government
simply because the defendant in an extradition case had claimed the
protection of the political offense exception, the process of extradition would grind to a standstill.
Every policy consideration dictates that the defendant bear both
the initial burden of producing evidence and the ultimate burden of
persuasion on the political offense issue. This will require the
defendant to present a prima facie case that the offense was a political one by producing sufficient evidence as to every element of his
claim.178

The placement of the burden of proof does not, of course,
resolve the question .f standard of proof: what quantum of proof
175. See Lubet and Czaczkes, supra note 4, at 209-20.
176. See supra note I.
177. Brief for Appellant at 25-29, Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
The presiding magistrate rejected this contention and ruled that the defendant was
required to demonstrate the link between the alleged crimes and his political objectives.
In re Abu Eain, Magis. No. 3-78-1899 (N.D. Cal., Opinion filed May 11, 1979).
178. See Hearingson S. 1639, supra note 18, at 184-86 (reprint of In re Mackin, 80 Cr.
Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y., opinion filed August 13, 1981)); and Lubet and Czaczkes, supra note
175, at 209.
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should be required in order to prevail in claiming the political
offense exception? 179 The various reform proposals are divided on
this issue. House of Representatives Bill 6046 would deny extradition where the political nature of the offense is proven by a "preponderance of the evidence."' 80 Senate Bill 1940 would require8 the
higher standard of proof by "clear and convincing evidence."' '1
The choice of a standard of evidence is an appropriate exercise
of legislative discretion, 8 2 which should be made with a view toward
advancing a substantial public policy. 8 3 As in the judicial context,
this may be done through the process of balancing the competing
interests involved.184

With regard to the political offense exception, the strongest policy arguments all favor the imposition of the higher standard of evidence upon the party seeking to assert the defense. The "mere
preponderance" standard, which is generally employed in civil litigation, is not demanding enough, since it requires the production of
only a minimally greater weight of the evidence in order for a party
to prevail. 8 5 This is the most subjective of all standards, focusing on
the relative strength of the evidence produced by the parties. It is
suitable for the trial of tort and contract cases where the only issue to
be resolved is which party is entitled to prevail in a claim for damages and where there is no strong public interest in the outcome.
The application of the political offense exception, however, involves
weighty issues of international impact which should be decided by a
86
more objective standard.1

179. See supra note 95.
180. See H.R. 6046, supra note 164, at § 3194(d)(2)(c): "The court shall not order a
person extraditable after a hearing under this section if the court finds-. . . the person
has established by the preponderance of the evidence that any offense for which such
person may be subject to prosecution or punishment if extradited is a political offense."
181. See S. REP. No. 475, supra note 167, at § 3194(e).
182. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252, 264-67 (1980) ("traditional powers of Congress to prescribe rules of evidence and standards of proof in the federal courts," id at

265).
183. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 752-57 (1982); Jones v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 186 S.W.2d 868, 873-74 (Mo. 1945). See also Allen, supra note 112, at 896, n.17; and
McCoRMicK's HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 786-88 (2d ed. 1972).
184. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982); and Addington v. Texas, 441

U.S. 418, 425 (1979).
185. Justice Blackmun, for the court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982),
stated: "[W]hile private parties may be interested intensely in a civil dispute over money
damages, application of a 'fair preponderance of the evidence' standard indicates both
society's 'minimal concern with the outcome,' and a conclusion that the litigants would
'share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion,"' (quoting from Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979)). See also Se-Ling Hosiery v. Marguilies, 364 Pa. 45, 70 A.2d
854 (1950): "[P]roof 'by a preponderance of the evidence' is the lowest degree of proof
recognized in the administration of justice'"
186. "Clear and convincing evidence is 'that measure or degree of proof which will
produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to the allegations
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The requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence will

strengthen foreign policy by making it more difficult for terrorists to
find haven in the United States. 187 The higher standard will limit

the extension of sanctuary, at least at the judicial level, to those who
can clearly prove that they are entitled to it. The clear and convincing evidence test also will serve the goal of preserving executive

flexibility in matters touching upon foreign affairs, 188 because it will
ensure that courts will decline to bar extradition in close or doubtful

cases. Courts, instead, will certify such matters for consideration by
the Secretary of State.

These governmental interests outweigh the interests of individual defendants in avoiding extradition solely by meeting a lower
burden of proof, because an adverse ruling will have greater conse-

quences for the government than for the accused. As noted above, a
final judicial ruling which upholds a political offense claim will bar
sought to be established." Hobson v. Eaton, 399 F.2d 781, 784, n.2 (6th Cir. 1968).
"Clear and convincing proof is a standard frequently imposed in civil cases where the
wisdom of experience has demonstrated the need for greater certainty.... This high
standard may be required to sustain claims which have serious social consequences or
harsh or far-reaching effects on individuals." United States v. Bridges, 133 F. Supp. 638,
641, n.5 (N.D. Cal. 1955). See also Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125
(1943) ("To set aside such a grant [of citizenship] the evidence must be clear, unequivocal
and convincing'---'it cannot be done upon a bare preponderance of evidence which
leaves the issue in doubt,"' quoting from Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 121 U.S. 325, 381
(1887).); Carpenter v. Union Insurance Society of Canton, Ltd., 284 F.2d 155, 162 (4th
Cir. 1960) (assertion of a criminal act as a defense in a civil action must be established by
clear and convincing proof); Regenold v. Baby Fold Inc., 68 Il.2d 419, 369 N.E.2d 858
(1977) (court should not set aside consent for adoption without proof by clear and convincing evidence that its execution was procured by fraud or duress); Pontano v Obbisso,
580 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Or. 1978) ("Proof of conduct creating a constructive trust must be
strong, clear and convincing evidence-evidence that is of 'extraordinary
persuasiveness.' ")
187. See, e.g., Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 520 (7th Cir. 1981), where Judge
Harlington Wood, for the court, expressed his resolution that the United States not
become a "safe haven" for terrorists: "We recognize the validity and usefulness of the
political offense exception, but it should be applied with great care lest our country
become a social jungle and an encouragement to terrorists everywhere." It has been the
policy of the State Department to strictly construe extradition treaties when terrorist
activities are involved. Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, for example, stated on
the floor of the Senate that the United States seeks to apprehend, bring to trial, and

penalize international terrorists. See An Act to CombatInternationalTerrorism: Hearings
on S.2236 Before the Senate Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 30
(1978) (Statement of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance). See also Lubet and Czaczkes,
supra note 175, at 196.
188. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)
("[Congressional legislation which is to be made effective through negotiation and
inquiry within the international field must often accord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were
domestic affairs alone involved"). Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211-13 (1962)
(Although questions involving foreign relations are generally political questions, "it is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance").
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extradition permanently, leaving the government without
recourse; 18 9 the enactment of any version of the pending reform legislation will eliminate the government's option of refiling the extradition request in a new forum. A ruling against the exception,
however, merely certifies the matter to the Secretary of State, 190 who
may nonetheless deny extradition on the basis of the political offense
exception or other humanitarian or policy grounds.' 9' Finally, even
a defendant who is extradited still will be afforded a full trial on the
issue of guilt or innocence in the requesting country.
The initial political offense decision is binding for the government, but it is strictly preliminary with regard to the defendant.
Under these circumstances it is appropriate, again at the judicial
level, that the risk of error be resolved in favor of extradition. This is
accomplished by requiring that the defendant prove the political
nature of the crime by clear and convincing evidence.
C. THE JUDICIAL ROLE

In the debate over extradition reform the most controversy has
been generated by the proposal to remove the consideration of the
political offense exception from the judiciary and place the decision
solely with the Secretary of State. The Departments of State and
Justice initiated this proposal, 192 which the Senate Judiciary Committee expressed in Senate Bill 1639. 93 Some commentators lauded
the suggestion for sole executive authority over the dispensation of
political asylum as an essential move toward preserving the integrity
189. See supra note 89.
190. See supra notes 83 and 88 and accompanying text.
191. See S.1940, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 3196(a)(3) (1982); and H.R. 6046, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 3194(e)(3)(B) (1982).
192. See Hearings on S.1639, supra note 18, at 66 (Department of Justice letter in
support of legislation, Aug. 4, 1981); at 67 (Department of State letter in support of legislation, Aug. 25, 1981); and at 319 (memorandum on extradition legislation, prepared by
staff of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in cooperation with the Departments of
State and Justice, Sept. 1981).
193. Id at 303, § 3194(a):
The court does not have jurisdiction to determine the merits of the charge
against the person by the foreign state or to determine whether the foreign state
is seeking the extradition of the person for a political offense, for an offense of a
political character, or for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person for
his political opinions.
See also, id at 307-08, § 3196(a)(3):
If a person is found extraditable pursuant to section 3194, the Secretary of State,
upon consideration of the provisions of the applicable treaty and this chapter,
may-... decline to order the surrender of the person if the Secretary is persuaded, by written evidence and argument submitted to him by the person
sought, that the foreign state is seeking the person's extradition for a political
offense or an offense of a political character, or for the purpose of prosecuting or
punishing the person for his political opinions.
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of United States foreign policy.1 94 Others condemned the approach
as an assault on fundamental civil liberties. 95 Alternative proposals
continue the debate. House of Representatives Bill 6046 preserves
the judicial role. 96 Senate Bill 1940, apparently a compromise, provides that the principal determination be made by the Secretary of
State, followed by limited judicial review. 9 7 The three
approaches-the executive, judicial and synthesis models-are analyzed in the following sections.
1.

The Executive Model

The extreme dissatisfaction with the rulings in the Mackin and
McMullen cases' 98 has led to mistrust of the ability of the judiciary
to apply the political offense exception in a manner consistent with
the international political goals of the government.1 99 To ensure that
the government is able to extradite offenders to friendly countries,
the executive model gives the Secretary of State full discretion over

the application of the political offense exception. 200 This admittedly
result-oriented approach is not, however, an argument of convenience. Substantial theoretical and practical considerations support
the position that the courts are not the appropriate forum for resolution of the political offense question.
The theoretical foundation for the executive model is the concept that application of the political offense exception is essentially a
political decision. Although the courts consistently have rejected the
argument that the political offense exception is a non-justiciable
political question under the terms of the United States Constitution,20 1 there can be no doubt that the decision is one which has

major implications for the conduct of foreign affairs.
194. See Hearingson S.1639, supra note 18, at 18 (testimony of M. Abbell, Director of
Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division, Department of Justice); at 53-55 (testimony of W. Hannay, attorney at law); and at 66 (State Department letter in support of
legislation, Aug. 25, 1981).
195. Id at 86-87 (statement of R.T. Capulong, chairperson of the Human Rights
Committee of the Philippine-American lawyers Association of New York); and at 351-53
(statement of A.M. Jabara, Esq.).
196. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
197. See S. REP. No. 475, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
198. See supra notes 31-41 and accompanying text.
199. See id; and Hearingson S.1639, supra note 18, at 12 (testimony of D. McGovern,
Deputy Legal Adviser, State Department); and at 51-59 (testimony of W. Hannay, attorney at law).
200. See Hearingson S.1639, supra note 18, at 13 (testimony of D. McGovern, Deputy
Legal Adviser, Department of State); at 16 (testimony of M. Abbell, Director of Office of
International Affairs, Criminal Division, Department of Justice); and at 55 (testimony of
W. Hannay, attorney at law).
201. See, e.g., Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513-14 (7th Cir. 1981); and United
States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 132-37 (2d Cir. 1981).
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Application of the political offense exception involves the examination and evaluation of political conditions in foreign countries,
and a judicial determination of the issue necessarily injects the court,
at least to some extent, into political disputes. 20 2 Furthermore, the
very nature of the extradition process, which is the enforcement of a
treaty between two nations for the rendition of fugitives, is part and
parcel of the conduct of foreign affairs. Extradition is intergovernmental and therefore political. Consequently, proponents of the
executive model argue that, as a matter of policy, the political
offense decision should be assigned to the executive branch in order
to allow sensitive political judgments to be made by the political
20 3
department of government.
This policy position is buttressed by the argument that the
courtroom is an extraordinarily cumbersome forum in which to
determine facts, which lie close to opinion, concerning the internal
affairs of other countries. A judge cannot conduct primary investigations and generally has no expertise in foreign affairs. Rather, the
court must rely upon the witnesses and experts marshalled by the
parties to give evidence concerning conditions thousands of miles,
and perhaps even dozens of years, removed from the locus of the
hearing. Under these circumstances the jurist is tempted to play the
role of amateur historian, sociologist, and political scientist.
In the Mackin case, for example, the magistrate held a broadranging hearing in which she took testimonial "evidence" on the history, politics, and religious conflicts in Northern Ireland. The result
was a lengthy opinion in which subtleties, nuances, and judgments of
opinion were presented as discrete facts. 204 Although the magistrate
certainly was diligent, the picture of Irish history and politics which
emerged was at best problematic. The executive branch is better
able to investigate, evaluate, and determine the nature of events in
other countries, and is not restricted by the need to regard every
aspect of a dispute as a fact which has been "proven"' or "not
proven."
William M. Hannay, a perceptive and persuasive advocate for
the executive model, further argues that the judicial mode of decision-making simply is inadequate to the task of applying the political offense exception:
Courts are accustomed to developing tests, rules, or formulas to resolve dis-

putes-pegs on which to hang their decisions-pigeonholes into which to sort
202. See Hearingson S. 1639, supra note 18, at 52-53 (testimony of W. Hannay, attorney at law).
203. See, e.g., id at 53.
204. See id at 188-223 (reprint of In re Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y., opinion
filed August 13, 1981)).
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their cases. Applying hard and fast rules to foreign affairs, however, is like
trying to shove a square plug in a round hole; nothing fits. Foreign affairs is
one of those situations where courts should refrain from involvement
because a meaningful test or rule simply cannot, indeed should not, be established. These are situations in which the exercise of political judgment is
called for; where the risks of damage that may result from inhibiting the
exercise of discretion and flexibility by imposing some unbending rule are
too great.20 5

On this basis Hannay urges the adoption of an executive model that
entirely precludes judicial review.20 6 Recognizing that this approach
would raise questions of procedural due process, Hannay argues that
only the rights of the government need to be ensured in the political

offense determination:
It is also misleading to talk of the fugitive's substative rights. The "political
offense" exception-like the concept of political asylum-is not a recognition
of some inalienable right of the fugitive. He has no right to commit crimes in
another country and escape extradition merely because the offenses were
committed with a political purpose. The right involved is that of the state
which has an interest in being able, when it deems it appropriate, to give
political asylum for humanitarian reasons or, more generally, to refuse to
20 7
become involved in domestic political disputes.

In the final analysis the arguments in favor of the executive

model rest heavily upon the perceived shortcomings-technical,
practical, and theoretical-in past judicial applications of the political offense exception. There can be no doubt that the executive
approach will offer a more streamlined, expeditious, and predictable

format than has been utilized in the past. These benefits still must be
weighed, however, against the traditional virtues of judicial review

in the context of reformed definitional and procedural law.
2. The JudicialModel

Under the terms of House of Representatives Bill 6046208 the
judiciary will continue to make the initial determination concerning
the political offense exception, subject to review by the Secretary of
State in those cases where the courts rule in favor of extradition. 20 9

205. Hearingson S. 1639, supra note 18, at 52-53.
206. Id at 62.
207. Id at 48-49.
208. H.R. 6046, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); see also H.R. REP. No. 627, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1982).
209. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 48, § 3194(d)(2): "The court shall
not order a person extraditable after a hearing under this section if the court finds-..
the person has established by the preponderance of the evidence that any offense for
which such person may be subject to prosecution or punishment if extradited is a political offense." The Secretary of State reviews extradition grants under § 3196(a), id at 51:
If a person is ordered extraditable after a hearing under this chapter the Secretary of State, in such Secretary's discretion, may order the surrender of the person ...

to the custody of an agent of the foreign state requesting extradition,

and may condition that surrender upon any conditions such secretary considers
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As in the past, a final judicial ruling denying extradition will be
binding on the government,2 10 and the courts will be bound to

refrain from passing judgment on either the motivations or procedures of the requesting state.2 1 1 Although the bill also makes a

number of important procedural changes, 212 proponents of the executive model criticize the bill's retention of the primacy of the judicial

role as inhibiting government efforts to combat international
21 3

terrorism.
The argument for preservation of a judicial role is strong.
Although in one sense the political offense exception is a matter of
governmental grace, 2 14 the concept of political asylum is so widespread and so well-accepted that it has become something more than
simply an optional provision found in bilateral treaties. The United
Nations Declaration of Human Rights provides for the fundamental
right of political asylum 21 5 and numerous multilateral treaties and
conventions include the asylum concept. 2 16 In fact, the principle that
a nation should not deliver a political offender to the government
against which he has taken up arms is held so universally that we
now commonly may speak of a right of political asylum. 21 7 Thus,
the political offense exception is a concept which is involved intimately with the international protection of human rights.
Even in the absence of a human rights analysis, extradition proceedings involve significant issues of individual physical liberty. The
necessary to effectuate the purposes of the applicable treaty concerning extradition or the interest of justice.
210. Id at 50, § 3195(a)(3)(B).
211. Id at 49, § 3194(e)(3)(A): "Any issue as to whether the foreign state is seeking
extradition of a person for the purpose of prosecuting or punishing the person because of
such person's political opinions, race, religion, or nationality shall be determined by the
Secretary of State in the discretion of the Secretary of State."
212. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32 (provisions for hearing by a full district judge and direct appeal by the losing party).
213. See Extradition Act of 1982: Hearings on HJ. 5227 Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (statement of D.
McGovern, Deputy Legal Adviser, State Department, Jan. 26, 1982).
214. See Hearingson S. 1639, supra note 18, at 48-50 (testimony of W. Hannay, attorney at law).
215. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 11 (quoting article 14 on
the right to political asylum).
216. See, e.g., Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T.
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; International Convention on Economic,
Social Cultural, Civil and Political Rights, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/6316; and Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
217. See generally M. GARCIA-MORA, supra note 8; Garcia-Mora, The Natureof Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of ExtraditionLaw, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226 (1962); Krenz,
The Refugee as a Subject ofInternationalLaw, 15 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 90 (1966); Roth,
The Right of Asylum Under United States Immigration Law, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 534
(1981).

284

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:247

consequence of an order of extradition is to compel the accused to
stand trial in a country which may be thousands of miles from the
place of his apprehension; and this will almost invariably involve the
effectuation of an involuntary transfer in the custody of the agents of
the requesting country. 218 Furthermore, though we commonly think
of extradition in terms of transient fugitives, there is no bar in
United States law to the rendition of resident aliens or even United
States citizens.219 Thus, an order of extradition may result in virtual
banishment from home and family, a punishment which in other
contexts has been called the loss of "all that makes life worth
living."22 o
The tradition of the United States has been to resolve questions
of individual rights in a neutral judicial forum. Although neither the
Constitution nor any international convention appear to require
judicial participation in the extradition process, 22' the political
offense exception has been considered a matter of fundamental
human rights for over 100 years: "[E]xtradition without an unbiased
hearing before an independent judiciary. . .[is] highly dangerous to
liberty and ought never be allowed in this country." 222 As the Court
of Appeals noted in Mackin, the United States traditionally has
applied this proposition with equal force to both the "probable
cause" and "political offense" aspects of extradition proceedings. 223
A major strength of the judicial process is that it provides for
decision-making in a public forum, attended by all the trappings of
fairness and completeness which a democratic system of government
values and ensures. A court may provide an environment which is
insulated from expediency and which is dedicated only to the determination of truth and the protection of individual rights. Of course,
the courts have no monopoly on fairness, and the executive branch is
capable of rendering principled and impartial decisions on the political offense exception. The judicial forum, however, brings with it
an appearance of propriety and regularity which cannot be duplicated in a purely executive proceeding. With regard to an issue as
sensitive to international public opinion as is the political offense
218. See 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1976).
219. See, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 360 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) In re Ryan,
360 F. Supp. 270, 272 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1973); and H.R. REP. No. 627, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
21(1982).
220. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 612 (1949) (quoting from Ng Fung Ho
v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922)).
221. See, e.g., Hearings on S.1639, supra note 18, at 48 (testimony of W. Hannay,
attorney at law).
222. In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, 113 (1852). See also United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 132-33 (2d Cir. 1981).
223. United States v. Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 132-37 (2d Cir. 1981).
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question, there is substantial force to the adage that the appearance
of fairness is as important as fairness itself.
Opponents of judicial participation argue that it is necessary to
adopt an executive model in order to avoid the embarrassment to the
government which results when the courts deny extradition on political grounds.224 The determination of the political offense issue by a
neutral and judicial forum, however, actually might diminish the
possibility of embarrassment to the government in the conduct of
foreign affairs. Although the executive model will allow the government to take whatever course it chooses, thereby avoiding the problem of executive inability to render a fugitive despite a governmental
desire to do so, a principled application of the political offense
exception could require the Secretary of State to refuse to extradite
an individual despite the desire of the government to maintain cooperative relations with the requesting country. A rebuff to a friendly
government, emanating directly from the office of the State Department, might prove more disruptive to diplomatic relations than
would the decision of a neutral court governed by internationally
accepted standards.
The McMullen case provides an example. McMullen's offense
2 25
was clearly directed against an installation of the British army.
The magistrate may have erred in applying the political offense
exception to the particular circumstances of McMullen's crime; however, under certain circumstances, some members of the Irish
Republican Army might commit an offense against the British which
could only be deemed political. In such a case, it could be more
advantageous to the conduct of United States foreign policy if the
decision against extradition stemmed from the judiciary rather than
directly from the executive. The use of the judicial branch as the
initial decision-maker would serve as a shield that would allow the
executive to avoid confrontation with friendly governments over
matters of international extradition.
The "judicial shield" also may serve to insulate the government
from adverse international consequences in cases in which the courts
ultimately approve extradition. The decision to extradite Abu Eain
to Israel was enormously unpopular both in the United States and
abroad. A well-organized "Defense Committee" mounted a substantial publicity campaign on Abu Eain's behalf, and a number of
224. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 18, at 45-46 (testimony of W. Hannay,
attorney at law); Hearingson HR.5227,supra note 213, at 6 (statement of D. McGovern,
Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State, Jan. 26, 1982). See also, United States v.
Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 133 (2d Cir. 1981).
225. In re McMullen, No. 3-78-1899 M.G. (N.D. Cal., memorandum decision filed
May 11, 1979) (refprintedin Hearingson S. 1639, supra note 18, at 294).
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Congressmen questioned the government's prosecution of the
case.226 The ambassadors of several Arab countries vehemently pro-

tested the extradition, 227 and the United Nations General Assembly
passed a resolution "strongly deploring" the rendition of Abu
Eain.228 The Jordanian ambassador denounced the extradition as "a

disgrace to human rights, human dignity, international law, and
'229
moral imperatives.
The United States responded to this storm of protest both by
defending the extradition on its merits and by invoking the fairness
of United States judicial procedures. The State Department's Memorandum Decision allowing the extradition repeatedly relied upon
the comprehensive nature of the judicial process as proof of the
inapplicability of the political offense exception. 230 The United
States representative to the United Nations, speaking on the floor of
the general assembly, argued against the resolution of condemnation
by detailing the fairness of the judicial process afforded to Abu
Eain. 231 Although the United Nations resolution eventually was
226. See 127 CONG. REc. H 9344 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1981) (statement of Rep. Crockett); and 128 CONG. REC. H104-H105 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1982) (statement of Rep.
Findley).
227. See 36 U.N. GAOR (101st mtg., Agenda item 12) at 2-3, 38-40, U.N. Doc. A/L.
58 (1981) (statement of Ambassador Nuseibeh, Jordan); at 22 (statement of Ambassador
Razzooqi, Kuwait) [hereinafter 36 U.N. GAOR].
228. See 36 U.N. GAOR, supra note 227, at 22 (statement of Ambassador Razzooqi,
Kuwait, introducing the draft resolution): "In operative paragraph 1 the General Assembly 'Strongly deplores the action of the Government of the United States of America in
extraditing Mr. Ziad Abu Eain to Israel, the occupying power."'
229. Id at 2 (statement of Ambassador Nuseibeh, Jordan).
230. See Hearings on S. 1639, supra note 18, at 133 (Memorandum of decision of the
Department of State in the case of the request by the State of Israel for the extradition of
Ziad Abu Eain).
231. See 36 U.N. GAOR, supra note 227, at 26 (statement of Ambassador Adelman,
United States):
Let me state unequivocally that Mr. Abu Eain received a fully independent and
impartial judicial review of the extradition request. The United States Magistrate, after hearing all of the evidence presented by the prosecutor and by Abu
Eain, found him extraditable under the terms of the United States-Israel exradition treaty.
The findings and the conclusions of the Magistrate were challenged by petition
for a writ of habeas corpus. In denying the petition, the United States District
Court judge reviewed the Magistrate's findings at length. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the order of denial, again
reviewing the findings and conclusions of the Magistrate.
Following judgment by the United States Court of Appeals, the defendant
petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Representing him as one of his attorneys, both in the Court of Appeals proceedings and
before the United States Supreme Court, was a former United States AttorneyGeneral. The Supreme Court, after considering full briefs on the issues, decided
that the case did not merit further review and denied the request for certiorari.
There can be no doubt that the defendant was adequately represented and
accorded all due process rights guaranteed in such proceedings and that the
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adopted by a substantial margin,2 32 the effectiveness of the due process argument was evidenced by the decisions of at least two delegations that premised abstention upon respect for the United States

233
judicial system.

The judicial approach to the initial determination of the polit-

ical offense exception is cumbersome, time consuming, and occasionally unreliable. The principal merit of the system, however, is

precisely that the outcome of the process cannot be controlled or
determined by the political branches of government. This element
of independence gives the judicial model an internationally recog-

nizable appearance of fairness and propriety, which allows the executive to invoke the credibility of the judiciary as a shield against

criticism and condemnation.
Proposed definitional and procedural reforms remedy the

defects in the past judicial process, while the judical model preserves
the strength of the traditional judicial shield in the United States
extradition process. 234

Furthermore, the proposed changes in

appealability, 235 and the retention of the Secretary of State's discretion over ultimate rendition, 236 should allay remaining fears raised

by the three recent cases that are cited by proponents of the executive model.3 7 The political asylum determination is tied intimately

to recognized fundamental human rights; the decision is not solely
political.2 38 By recognizing the requirements of the contemporary
United States judiciary, on all three levels, accorded the defendant full,
independent and impartial review.
232. The General Assembly adopted the resolution by 75 votes to 21, with 43 abstentions. Id at 111-12.
233. Ambassador Pinies from Spain stated: "The draft resolution describes the detention of Mr. Abu Eain as illegal which seems to call into question the judicial system of
the United States. In those circumstances, we shall be obliged to abstain on the vote on
the draft resolution before us." Id at 11.
Ambassador Auguste of Saint Lucia also stated that his delegation would abstain out
of deference to the judicial system of the United States:
On the other hand, we must jealously guard against the intrusion of third States
into the internal affairs of a State, particularly when this applies to the operation
of the judicial system. The corporate body of established law, giving evidence of
practice throughout the common law countries, establishes beyond doubt the
total independence of the judiciary. There is no ground,primafacie,and in consideration of the decision of the United States Supreme Court, to warrant any
refutation of the extradition judgment based on an intimation that the Court
may have acted less than scrupulously in determining that Ziad Abu Eain had a
proper and legitimate case to answer before the Israeli courts within the term of
the Penal Code of the State of Israel.
Id at 91-92.
234. See supra sections III.A. and B, and text accompanying supra notes 224-25.
235. See supra notes 131-32 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
238. Proponents of the executive model disagree. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
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environment in reforming the definition of a political offense, the

2 39
judicial inquiry need not be as unreliable as past decisions reflect.

Thus, retaining the primacy of the judicial role in the context of substantive and procedural reform preserves the traditional strengths of

the United States process, while it resolves the problems posed by
modem international terrorism.
3. The Synthesis Model

Following the first round of congressional debate, an amended
bill was introduced in the Senate which attempted to synthesize the

executive and judicial approaches to the political offense exception.240 Senate Bill 1940 creates a system of executive primacy in the
decision-making, while maintaining the possibility of limited judicial
review.
The synthesis model removes the political offense decision from

the jurisdiction of the trial court24 and gives the Secretary of State
responsibility for the initial determination.2 42 A defendant claiming
the benefit of the exception would be entitled to submit written evidence and argument to the State Department, but no adversary hear-

ing would be held and no testimony would be taken. 243 In those
cases in which the Secretary of State has denied the political offense

claim, the decision would be appealable to a United States Circuit
Court of Appeals, with the provision that the court could not set
aside the Secretary's decision if it was based on substantial
evidence.

244

239. See supra section III.A.
240. S. 1940, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). See S. REP. No. 331, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982).
241. S. REP. No. 331, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 33, § 3194(a) (1982): "The court does not
have jurisdiction to determine ... whether the foreign state is seeking the extradition of
the person for political offense, for an offense of a political character, or for the purpose
of prosecuting or punishing the person for his political opinions."
242. Id at 35, § 3196(a)(3):
If a person is found extraditable pursuant to section 3194, the Secretary of State,
upon consideration of the provisions of the applicable treaty and this chapter...shall decline to order the surrender of the person if the Secretary is persuaded by written evidence and argument submitted to him by the person
sought, that the foreign state is seeking the person's extradition for a political
offense or an offense of a political character, or for the purpose of prosecuting the
person for his political opinions.
243. Id at 20.
244. Id at 36, § 3196(a):
A decision by the Secretary ... denying the person's claim that the foreign state
is seeking his extradition for a political offense or an offense of a political character may be appealed by the person to the United States court of appeals to which
an appeal under section 3195 would lie. The court shall not set aside the Secretary's decision if it is based on substantial evidence.
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At first, this approach appears to answer many of the objections
that have been raised to both the executive and judicial models. It
eliminates the need to hold lengthy and potentially embarrassing
hearing in the trial court and it affirms the primacy of the executive
branch in making political decisions of international import. 245 The
synthesis model, nonetheless, preserves the possibility of impartial
judicial review as a safeguard against arbitrary extradition.
Closer scrutiny, however, reveals that this synthesis actually
combines the worst elements of both of its components. The Secretary of State will be required to make a public ruling on the political
offense question prior to determination by any court. Thus, the Secretary may be placed in the vulnerable position of having his personal order in favor of extradition rejected as unlawful by a United
States court. Alternatively, the Secretary will be unable to defer to
the courts the embarrassing decision to deny the extradition request
of a friendly country or wartime ally.246 In short, the synthesis
model fails to accomplish the goal of enhancing executive flexibility,
while at the same time it denies the Secretary of State the benefit of
the judicial shield. Thus, proponents of the executive model should
find the synthesis model unacceptable.
Senate Bill 1940 similarly should be unsatisfactory to advocates
of the judicial model, because it fails to provide for a public evidentiary hearing.247 While review by a court of appeals does provide for
some participation by an independent judiciary, the substantial evidence standard that the bill imposes, in most cases, will require summary affirmance of the Secretary's decision. 24 8
The synthesis model clearly represents an attempt to resolve the
conflict between the executive and judicial approaches to the political offense exception. This resolution, however, combines all of the
vices of the two pure models, while containing few of their virtues.
The synthesis approach, if adopted, will fail to provide adequate due
process safeguards for the accused and needlessly will expose the
Secretary of State to the possibility of rebuke on sensitive international issues.
CONCLUSION
Current United States extradition treaties do not establish a definition of the political offense exception and do not provide a format
245. Id at 20.
246. See H.R. REP. No. 627, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1982).
247. Id
248. Id at 23.
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for its application. 249 The jurisprudence developed through the judicial process has not proven adequate to deal with the situations confronting it in modem times. Consequently, the entire area of law is
ripe for legislative reform. The enactment of a single, comprehensive statute that will govern the application of nearly 100 bilateral
treaties is necessarily a complex undertaking. Care must be taken to
avoid placing the United States in breach of existing treaties that
may have been premised on the traditional process, 250 and due
regard must be given to the norms and practices of international
custom.

25

1

249. See supra notes 17 and 46.
250. It is beyond question that Congress possesses the power to legislate even in direct
contravention of both existing treaties and international law. See, e.g., Cook v. United
States, 288 U.S. 102, 119-20 (1933); White v. Mechanics Securities Corp., 269 U.S. 283,
300 (1925); Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); and Head Money Cases,
112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884). Legislation is not to be interpreted as abrogating a treaty
provision unless such an intent was clearly manifested by Congress. See, e.g., Pigeon
River Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 157-60 (1934); Cook v. United States,
288 U.S. 102, 119 (1933); and United States v. Payne, 264 U.S. 446, 448 (1924).
The current proposals for extradition reform do not appear to be intended to abrogate
any treaties. Rather, the proposals have been offered to revise the antiquated statutes
which govern the implementation of existing treaties. See Hearingon . 1639, supra note
18, at 5 (statement of M. Abbell, Director, Office of International Affairs, Criminal Division, Department of Justice). Procedural matters are domestic in nature and are appropriate subjects for congressional determination. Congress may repeal or modify
legislation in order to better implement treaty provisions. See G. SUTHERLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRS

139 (1919). In any event, the issue of breach of

a bilateral treaty is determined by the affected party, id See also Charlton v. Kelly, 229
U.S. 447, 473-76 (1913). Because each of the proposed reform bills simplifies the extradition process, it is inconceivable that any treaty partners of the United States would
declare the United States to be in breach for enacting reforms that are likely to result in
fewer denials of extradition requests. Whether a future defendant will be able to raise a
defense of "reliance" on the old law is an issue which is yet to be determined.
251. Although the United States is not obliged to follow customary international law
in the area of extradition, see supra note 250, the current reform debate has given substantial consideration to international practice. The most commonly proposed definition
of "political offense" relies on existing treaties and the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, supra note 142. See supra notes 136-44 and accompanying text.
There is no uniform international practice regarding the procedure for applying the
political offense exception. The nations of the world use executive, judicial and synthesis
models. The judicial model is predominant among the common law countries, although
both Canada and Australia follow the executive approach. See, e.g., Extradition Act,
1870, 33 & 34 Vict., ch. 52, § 3 (United Kingdom); and Extradition (Foreign States) Act,
[1966]. AUSTL. C. AcTs No. 76 at 660, § 14. Among the European nations France uses a
judicial model (Extradition Law of March 10, 1927 D.P. IV 265); West Germany follows
a strictly executive approach (supra note 12); and Austria and Switzerland have mixed
systems (Statute on Extradition, 1979 ARGH § 14 (Austria); Laws of Jan. 22, 1892 A.S.,
Art. 10(1) (Switzerland)). Similarly, there appears to be no uniform practice, and consequently no customary international law, concerning matters such as burden of proof or
appealability.
Thus, the United States should be relatively free to adopt extradition procedures
according to considerations of domestic policy. Although this legislative freedom may be
circumscribed by broad international principles (see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying
text), those issues cannot be discussed in the abstract and must be saved for consideration
upon the passage of legislation.

19821

EXTRADITION REFORM

The debate on the future of the political offense exception has
been healthy and productive. It now appears certain that the legislature will provide much needed guidance in this little known but sensitive area, and that a statutory definition of the political offense
exception will emerge which is consonant with United States policy
toward the apprehension and punishment of international terrorists.
The judicial model for determination of the political offense
exception is the approach that best harmonizes the protection of
political dissent with the punishment of wanton violence. Although
the past judicial practice had its shortcomings, procedural and substantive reforms will resolve those problems. The enactment of a
definition of political offense which abandons the overinclusive Castioni test will ensure that the courts do not extend the protection of
the exception to those who practice violence against civilians. Furthermore, placing the burden of proof on the defendant and adopting a clear and convincing evidence standard will reduce the
potential for judicial error and will maximize executive flexibility
behind a judicial shield. Finally, the availability of direct appeal for
all parties will provide for adequate judicial review and will eliminate the potential for a magistrate to thwart the foreign policy goals
of the executive.
Following the adoption of these reforms, initial jurisdiction over
the political offense exception may continue to reside safely in the
judiciary without fear of unduly limiting the discretion of the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs. By maintaining the primacy of
the neutral judicial forum, the vitality of the political offense exception, with its intimate ties to fundamental human rights, can be
preserved.

